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may qualify as a reorganization under section 368(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code.' If it does, the corporations will not
have to recognize any gain.' In the course of the reorganiza-
tion, the corporations may distribute property to their share-
holders. The shareholders, in turn, need not recognize any
gain if they receive stock, and in some cases other securities,
of either of the reorganizing corporations in exchange for
stock or securities issued by those corporations.' But if the
shareholders receive securities having too high a principal
amount, or cash or other property, collectively referred to as
"boot,' 4 they must recognize gain. The gain recognized may
be treated as capital gain under section 356(a)(1) of the
Code.'
If the exchange has "the effect of a dividend" under sec-
tion 356(a)(2),O some or all of the gain recognized may be
taxed at dividend rates. The proportion of the gain that is ac-
tually taxable as a dividend depends on the amount of earn-
ings and profits available for the dividend treatment. This ar-
ticle addresses the issue of whether an exchange of stock for
boot has the "effect of a dividend" within the meaning of sec-
tion 356(a)(2).
The effect of section 356(a)(2) on the taxability of a dis-
tribution may be illustrated by the following hypothetical re-
organization: A and B want to sell X their small vegetable
wholesaling business with accumulated earning and profits of
1. I.R.C. § 368(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1977-1981). Unless otherwise stated, all ref-
erences to section numbers are to the Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter cited as the
Code].
2. I.R.C. § 361 (1976).
3. I.R.C. § 354 (1976 & Supp. IV 1977-1981). See infra note 14.
4. The use of the term "boot" appears to arise from the observation that, at the
termination of a reorganization transaction, the shareholders making the exchange
held stock in the new corporation "plus money to boot." Liddon v. Commissioner, 22
T.C. 1220, 1224 (1954); 64 CONG. REc. 2852 (1923) (remarks of Rep. Green).
5. I.R.C. § 356(a)(1) (1976). See infra note 15.
6. I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (1976) provides:
If an exchange is described in paragraph (1) but has the effect of the
distribution of a dividend, then there shall be treated as a dividend to
each distributee such an amount of the gain recognized under paragraph
(1) as is not in excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings
and profits of the corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913. The
remainder, if any, of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) shall be
treated as gain from the exchange of property.
7. The term "dividend equivalency" is often used to characterize exchanges
that have "the effect of a dividend" within the meaning of § 356(a)(2).
[Vol. 23
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$25. Y Corporation, a supermarket chain whose net worth is
100 times that of X, is willing to either exchange one share of
its publicly traded stock or pay $1.00 for each share of X in a
statutory merger. A owns 80 of X's 100 outstanding shares of
stock, B owns 20, and they both purchased their stock for
$0.10 a share. B wants to receive only Y stock, but A prefers
$40 and only 40 shares of Y stock. Under section 356(a)(1), A
will be required to recognize as gain the portion of his boot
which is less than or equal to the total gain he realized on his
overall exchange in the reorganization.'
If A's exchange of $40 worth of stock for $40 worth of
boot is found to have "the effect of a dividend" under section
356(a)(2), some boot will be treated as a dividend. Such treat-
ment will only be imposed on the amount of boot that is not
greater than the lesser of: (a) A's gain recognized on the over-
all exchange of his X stock, or (b) his ratable share of X's
accumulated earnings and profits. Since the exchange of
stock is assumed to have had the "effect of a dividend" under
section 356(a)(2), A must report $20 of the $40 boot as divi-
dends. The remaining $20 must still be recognized as capital
gain under section 356(a)(1).10
Section 356(a)(2) itself does not indicate whether A's ex-
change has the "effect of a dividend." Courts, the Internal
Revenue Service1" and commentators have been unable to set-
8. A realized $72 gain in the reorganization, computed as follows:
Fair market value ("FMV") of Y stock = $40
FMV of boot = $40
Amount Realized = $80
Basis (80 shares in X times $0.10) = $ 8
Gain Realized = $72
Since the $72 gain realized is greater than the $40 boot, A must recognize the entire
$40 boot as gain from the sale or exchange of property.
(a) A's gain recognized is $40. See infra note 15.
(b) A's ratable share of X's accumulated earnings and profits ("E&P") is $20.
80% ($25 accumulated E&P) = $20.
9. Hereinafter referred to as E&P. For a more detailed discussion of how B's
ratable share of earnings should be computed, see infra Part III, footnotes 125-59 and
accompanying text. For an explanation of the reasons for not including X's current
earnings and profits, see infra Part III, section B, footnotes 127-59 and accompanying
text.
10. (a) A's gain recognized is $40. See infra note 17. (b) A's ratable share of
X's accumulated E&P is $20. 80% of $25 accumulated E&P = $20.
11. Hereinafter cited as the Service.
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tie on one approach in determining the "true effect" of an ex-
change of stock for boot. As a result of this confusion, share-
holders such as A must plan their transactions in accordance
with the various tests that have been considered by the courts
and commentators.
A survey of both the legislative history and judicial devel-
opment of dividend equivalency under section 356(a)(2) shows
that courts and commentators have recommended a variety of
tests for the determination of dividend equivalency. An in
depth analysis of these tests reveals that the only adequate
test to determine whether an exchange has the "effect of a
dividend" is the test adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Wright
v. United States. ' All the other approaches generate results
that are patently at odds with the purposes of the Code. This
article further considers the different positions taken by
courts with regard to the question of which corporation's E&P
are available to characterize the shareholder's gain as a divi-
dend, and whether only accumulated E&P are to be consid-
ered. The suggested method to determine the source of the
dividend, and the amount of E&P properly allocable to the
shareholder's boot set out and analyzed will show that the ap-
proach to dividend equivalency recommended herein should
be employed by the courts.
II. DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCY
A. Legislative History and Judicial Development
Under the general rule of section 1001, a shareholder who
sells stock or securities in one corporation in exchange for
those of another corporation must recognize any gain or loss
realized.18 This rule is suspended when the exchange is part of
12. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973); afl'g 29 A.F.T.R.2d
72-1466 (E.D. Ark. 1972). The Wright Court's approach has received support from
many commentators. See Cohen, Receipts Related to Corporate Equity: Return on
Investment or Exchange, 53 TAXES 824 (1975); Fassler, Fifth Circuit's Shimberg Jr.
Decision-Automatic Dividend Treatment of Boot in Acquisitive Reorganizations,
57 TAXES 159 (1979); Horwood, Clarified IRS Position Enhances Planning for Stock
Redemptions with New Shareholders, 46 J. TAX'N 338 (1977); Leven, Adess & Mc-
Gaffey, Reorganizations-Determination of Dividend Equivalency, 30 TAX LAW. 287
(1979); Comment, Taxation of Boot Received During Acquisitive Reorganizations:
Dividend v. Capital Gains, 13 U. RiCH. L. REV. 621 (1979); Note, Taxation of Boot
Distributions: A Return to Bedford?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 987 (1979).
13. I.R.C. § 1001 (1976 & Supp. IV 1977-1981).
[Vol. 23
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a reorganization as defined in section 368(a).14 If the share-
holder receives boot, however, he must recognize the gain he
realized, limited to the fair market value of the boot
received. 15
When Congress first permitted the distribution of boot in
an otherwise tax-free reorganization, section 203(d)," the
original predecessor of section 356(a), treated the transaction
as gain from the sale of a capital asset. A loophole existed,
however. Because the rate of tax on dividends was signifi-
cantly higher than on capital gains, corporations could reor-
ganize for the sole purpose of distributing boot to their share-
holders. They could also withhold dividends for distribution
in the course of an anticipated reorganization. They were thus
able to "bail out" earnings at capital gains rates even though
the distributions of earnings were more properly taxable to
the shareholders as dividends. Congress therefore enacted sec-
tion 203(d)(2), the predecessor of section 356(a)(2). The sec-
tion provided that if an exchange of stock or securities for
boot had "the effect of a dividend," the recognized gain was to
be treated as a dividend to the extent of the shareholder's
"ratable share" of accumulated E&P.17  No substantial
14. I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (1976) provides in full:
(1) In General-No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or secur-
ities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the
plan or reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such
corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization.
15. Section 356(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Recognition of Gain-If-
(A) section 354. . . would apply to an exchange but for the fact
that
(B) the property received in the exchange consists not only of
property permitted by section 354. . . to be received without the recog-
nition of gain hut also of other property or money,
then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an
amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market
value of such other property.
16. Internal Revenue Act of 1924 (as amended), § 203(d), 42 Stat. 1560.
17. Internal Revenue Act of 1924, § 203(d)(2), 43 Stat. 253, 257. The statute
provided in full:
If a distribution made in pursuance of a plan of reorganization is within
the provisions of paragraph (1) but has the effect of the distribution of a
taxable dividend, then there shall be taxed as a dividend to each distrib-
utee such an amount of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) as is
not in excess of his ratable share of undistributed earnings and profits of
the corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913. The remainder, if
any, of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) shall be taxed as a gain
from the exchange of property.
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changes in the provision have since been made."8
1. Legislative History
When Congress enacted section 203(d)(2)," it provided
few indications of the section's scope.20 It is therefore unclear
which exchanges of stock for boot Congress wished to charac-
terize as having the "effect of a dividend." The 1924 House
and Senate Committee Reports' furnish only one example,
"the 1924 Hypothetical," of the abuse sought to be corrected
by section 203(d)(2). A corporation merged into an empty
shell for the sole purpose of bailing out, at capital gain rates,
accumulated earnings and profits which were properly taxable
as dividends. The predecessor corporation transferred to the
shell all its assets including its accumulated earnings and
profits. The shareholders of the predecessor corporation si-
multaneously exchanged their stock in the predecessor for the
shell's stock plus the earnings. According to the Committee
Reports, section 203(d)(2) would prevent taxpayers from
evading the taxes on dividends by withdrawing earnings at
capital gain rates, under section 202(d), 2  through
reorganizations.
Since the merger depicted in the 1924 Hypothetical was a
blatant abuse of the reorganization provisions,' Congressional
Paragraph (1) referred to the predecessor of § 356(a)(1), § 203(d)(1) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Act of 1924, which stated:
If an exchange would be within the provisions of paragraph (1), (2), or
(4) of subdivision (b) if it were not for the fact that the property re-
ceived in exchange consists not only of property permitted by such para-
graph to be received without the recognition of gain, but also of other
property or money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recog-
nized, but in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the
fair market value of such other property.
18. See supra note 6.
19. See 8upra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
20. Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 290 (1945) (Frankfurter,
J., speaking for a unanimous court, found the legislative history "not illuminating");
Samansky, Taxation of Nonqualifying Property Distributed in Reorganization, 31
CASE W. REs. 1, 11, 46 (1980); Shoulson, Boot Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Auto-
matic Rule, 20 TAx L. REv. 573, 578-79 (1965).
21. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1923). See also S. REP. No. 398,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1923).
22. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
23. The underlying presupposition of a reorganization is that it is to be under-
taken for reasons germane to the conduct of the business venture. An adjustment in
corporate form effected for the sole purpose of avoiding taxes is not one of the trans-
actions contemplated as a corporate "reorganization" within the meaning of § 368(a).
[Vol. 23
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intent may have been to limit dividend equivalence to reorga-
nizations which are effected solely to bail out E&P. If this
were true, a distribution of boot to a minority shareholder,
who could not ordinarily compel such a distribution because
of his lack of control, during a reorganization in which he re-
ceives only stock could not possibly have the "effect of a
dividend."24
The Treasury Regulations, the Service and the courts
have correctly viewed section 356(a)(2) otherwise.25 They have
recognized that the non-recognition feature of a reorganiza-
tion is founded on the assumption "that the new property is
substantially a continuation of the old investment unliqui-
dated."' 6 The tax free exchange of stock and securities that
accompanies the distribution of boot is thus viewed as affect-
ing a mere adjustment in the form of a continuing investment,
rather than a sale. Hence, the boot may properly be regarded
as simply a distribution of property to a shareholder in his
capacity as such, resulting in dividend rather than capital gain
treatment. The term "effect of a dividend," however, gives lit-
tle guidance in determining whether the view of the reorgani-
zation as a sale should apply to A's boot, or whether the "sub-
stantially continued old investment" rationale should govern.
The two approaches generate opposite results.
It has been argued that the 1924 Hypothetical 7 makes it
clear that an exchange which would have been treated as a
dividend before the reorganization should never be granted
capital gain treatment when made part of the reorganiza-
tion."8 The conclusion does not follow from the 1924 Hypo-
thetical. The reorganization depicted was a clear attempt to
abuse section 203(d), the predecessor of section 356(a)(1), by
merging into a shell. It involved no reshuffling or mingling of
interests such as occurs in an acquisitive reorganization.2" If
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1934).
24. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(c) (1972); Rev. Rul. 83, 1975-1 C.B. 112;
Shimberg v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev'd, 577 F.2d 283(5th Cir. 1979). As the Eighth Circuit stated in Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600
(8th Cir. 1972), aff'g 29 A.F.T.R. 2d 72-1466 (E.D. Ark. 1972), "[A boot] distribution
has some but not all the characteristics of either a sale or a dividend." Id. at 604.
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1980).
27. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
28. American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204, 228 (1970).
29. Today, the transaction would probably be classified as a type F reorganiza-
1983]
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Congress intended dividend equivalency to be inferred when-
ever the exchange would have been a dividend had it preceded
the reorganization, Congress would not have prescribed that
the dividend within gain limitation should apply to the mere
change in name effected in the 1924 Hypothetical. 0 Pure divi-
dend treatment could just as easily have been imposed.
This hypothetical redemption involves a pre-reorganiza-
tion analytical approach. It would have been far more compli-
cated to formulate a generally applicable method for applying
a post-reorganization, constructive redemption analysis. The
legislators could not simplistically direct that an exchange be
treated as a dividend if it "would have had the effect of a
dividend if it had followed the reorganization." If the re-
deeming shareholder held securities or more than one class of
stock in the acquiring corporation after the reorganization, it
would be unclear whether the hypothetically owned and re-
deemed instruments were securities, or stock that was com-
mon or preferred, voting or non-voting. Yet the character of
the exchange of stock for boot would depend on the nature of
the instrument redeemed.
The character of an exchange of stock for boot can be al-
tered in a variety of ways by the complex changes that take
place in a reorganization. The principles now embodied in sec-
tion 302 had not yet been developed.3 1 Even if the drafters of
tion, a mere change in identity, form, or place if it qualified as a reorganization at all.
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(F) (1976 & Supp. IV 1977-1981). See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 14 (1979) for an
analysis of reorganizations under the Internal Revenue Code.
30. The limitation of dividend treatment to the amount of gain recognized per-
mitted part of the distribution, in this type D or F reorganization, to escape the tax
on dividends. This might have been an oversight on Congress' part.
31. I.R.C. § 302 (1976 & Supp. IV 1977-1981). Section 302 provides:
(a)General Rule
If a corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning of section
317(b)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) applies,
such redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full pay-
ment in exchange for the stock.
(b) Redemptions treated as exchanges
(1) Redemptions not equivalent to dividends
Subsection (a) shall apply -if the redemption is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend.
(2) Substantially disproportionate redemption of stock
(A) In general
Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribution is substantially dispro-
portionate with respect to the shareholder.
(B) Limitation
[Vol. 23
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section 203(d)(2) had been able to determine what types of
This paragraph shall not apply unless immediately after the re-
demption the shareholder owns less than 50 percent of the total coin-
bined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote.
(C) Definitions
For purposes of this paragraph, the distribution is substantially dis-
proportionate if-
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by
the shareholder immediately after the redemption bears to all of the
voting stock of the corporation at such time,
is less than 80 percent of-
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by
the shareholder immediately before the redemption bears to all of the
voting stock of the corporation at such time.
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated as sub-
stantially disproportionate unless the shareholder's ownership of the
common stock of the corporation (whether voting or nonvoting) after
and before the redemption also meets the 80 percent requirement of the
preceding sentence. For purposes of the preceding sentence, if there is
more than one class of common stock, the determinations shall be made
by reference to fair market value.
(D) Series of redemptions
This paragraph shall not apply to any redemption made pursuant
to a plan the purpose or effect of which is a series of redemptions result-
ing in a distribution which (in the aggregate) is not substantially dispro-
portionate with respect to the shareholder.
(3) Termination of shareholder's interest
Subsection (a) shall apply if the redemption is in complete redemp-
tion of all of the stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder.
(4) Application of paragraphs
In determining whether a redemption meets the requirements of
paragraph (1), the fact that such redemption fails to meet the require-
ments of paragraph (2), (3), or (4) shall not be taken into account. If a
redemption meets the requirements of paragraph (3) and also the re-
quirements of paragraph (1), (2), or (4), then so much of subsection
(c)(2) as would (but for this sentence) apply in respect of the acquisition
of an interest in the corporation within the 10-year period beginning on
the date of the distribution shall not apply.
(c) Constructive ownership of stock
(1) In general
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, section
318(a) shall apply in determining the ownership of stock for purposes of
this section.
(2) For determining termination of interest
(A) In the case of a distribution described in subsection (b)(3),
section 318(a)(1) shall not apply if-
(i) immediately after the distribution the distributee has no in-
terest in the corporation (including an interest as officer, director, or
employee), other than an interest as a creditor,
(ii) the distributee does not acquire any such interest (other
than stock acquired by bequest or inheritance) within 10 years from the
date of such distribution, and
(iii) the distributee, at such time and in such manner as the Sec-
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instruments should be deemed hypothetically owned and re-
deemed, the legislators were not equipped with the tools to
characterize the redemptions.
Several attempts to amend section 356(a)(2) by adopting
the pre-reorganization, hypothetical redemption test have
been made, but Congress has rejected them all. 2 Little can be
deduced, however, from these rejections, since the proposed
amendments also removed the dividend within gain limita-
retary by regulations prescribes, files an agreement to notify the Secre-
tary of any acquisition described in clause (ii) and to retain such records
as may be necessary for the application of this paragraph.
If the distributee acquires such an interest in the corporation (other
than by bequest or inheritance) within 10 years from the date of the
distribution, then the periods of limitation provided in sections 6501
and 6502 on the making of an assessment and the collection by levy or a
proceeding in the court shall, with respect to any deficiency (including
interest and additions to the tax) resulting from such acquisition, in-
clude one year immediately following the date on which the distributee
(in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary) notifies the
Secretary of such acquisition; and such assessment and collection may
be made notwithstanding any provision of law or rule of law which oth-
erwise would prevent such assessment and collection.
(B) Subparagraph (A) of this paragraph shall not apply if-
(i) any portion of the stock redeemed was acquired, directly or
indirectly, within the 10-year period ending on the date of the distribu-
tion by the distributee from a person the ownership of whose stock
would (at the time of distribution) be attributable to the distributee
under section 318(a), or
(ii) any person owns (at the time of the distribution) stock the
ownership of which is attributable to the distributee under section
318(a) and such person acquired any stock in the corporation, directly or
indirectly, from the distributee within the 10-year period ending on the
date of the distribution, unless such stock so acquired from the distribu-
tee is redeemed in the same transaction.
The preceding sentence shall not apply if the acquisition (or, in the case
of clause (ii), the disposition) by the distributee did not have as one of
its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax.
(d) Redemptions treated as distributions of property
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, if a corporation
redeems its stock (within the meaning of section 317(b)), and if subsec-
tion (a) of this section does not apply, such redemption shall be treated
as a distribution of property to which section 301 applies.
32. The first attempt was made in 1954. The House proposal recommended
treating the distribution as though it had been made by the acquired corporation
prior to the reorganization. H.R. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 306 (1954). The propo-
sal was rejected by the Senate. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1954). A
similar attempt was made in 1959. H.R. 4459, 96 Cong., 1st Sess. § 21 (1959). This
attempt was also rejected. Other proposals for statutory amendments have been
made. See XVIII ABA TAX SECTION BULL., No. 4, at 42-45 (July, 1965); AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1
(1977).
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tion, and prescribed that only the earnings and profits of the
acquired corporation were to be available for the shareholder's
dividend exposure. The proposed amendments may have been
rejected because of any one of these additional recommenda-
tions or for some other reason."
2. Judicial Development of "Dividend Equivalency"
Initially, the courts invariably found that every distribu-
tion of property in the course of a reorganization had the ef-
fect of a dividend under section 203(d)(2). 3 ' This approach
reached its height in Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford. 5 A
corporation recapitalized in order to pay what was, in effect, a
dividend. The Supreme Court found the distribution to be out
of earnings and profits and therefore presumptively a divi-
dend. The Court stated further that it could not see why any
different treatment should apply to an exchange made in the
course of an acquisitive reorganization.3
Soon afterwards, courts began to question the validity of
this automatic dividend rule. The First Circuit abandoned the
Bedford approach when it noted in Lewis v. Commissioner 7
that it might have found that an exchange did not have the
effect of a dividend, if the taxpayer had presented an argu-
ment for capital gain treatment.38 In Lewis, the predecessor
corporation liquidated two of its three lines of business. Since
the purpose of the reorganization was to protect the proceeds
from the claims of the creditors of the last line of business, it
appears that the First Circuit would have welcomed a partial
liquidation analysis.3 9 The court's reluctance to explicitly
33. In his testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, Norris Dar-
rel indicated that the boot treatment proposals in H.R. 8300 may not have been
dropped because of specific objections, but were, rather, lost in the shuffle because of
Senate objections to other portions of Subchapter C in the House bill. Hearings on
Topics Pertaining to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 2602 (statement of
Norris Darrel). See also Darrel, Internal Revenue Code of 1954-A Striking Example
of the Legislative Process in Action, 1955 U.S. CAL. TAx INST. 1.
34. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Owens, 69 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1939); Woodard v.
Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 1216 (1934); McCord v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 342
(1934). See also Golub, "Boot" in Reorganization- The Dividend Equivalency Test
of 356(a)(2), 58 TAXES 904, 907 (1980).
35. 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
36. Id. at 292.
37. 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949).
38. Id. at 650-51.
39. If the corporation had not reorganized but instead distributed the proceeds
1983]
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adopt this analysis and thereby abrogate Bedford's automatic
dividend rule may have been due to the Supreme Court's
statement in Bedford that the partial liquidation provisions
had no bearing on dividend equivalence under section
356(a)(2).4o
After Lewis, the mere fact that stock was exchanged for
boot in the course of a reorganization no longer made the ex-
change per se equivalent to a dividend. It might instead be
appropriate to treat the boot as the proceeds from the sale or
exchange of an interest in property. The facts of the case,
however, did not permit the First Circuit to consider whether,
in an acquisitive reorganization, the contemporaneous tax-free
exchanges of stock for stock might have an impact on the
character of the exchange of stock for boot.
The Court of Claims began to focus on the reduction in
corporate ownership effected by the exchange of stock for
boot in Idaho Power Co. v. United States"1 and Ross v.
United States.42 The court noted in both cases that an impor-
tant indicium of dividend equivalency would be present if the
shareholder had "substantially the same interest in the corpo-
ration after the payment as he had before."4
In Idaho Power, the court found that a shareholder's ex-
change of stock for boot did not have the effect of the distri-
bution of a dividend. The holding relied on both the reduction
in his voting power that was caused by the reorganization and
the drop in the value of the shareholder's corporate
investment.
In Ross, the Court of Claims continued this line of analy-
sis by ruling that section 356(a)(2) was to be read in pari
materia with section 302." While contradictory language in
the Ross opinion casts some doubt on the court's intent, it is
assumed that the court intended to adopt a redemption analy-
of the sale of two lines of business, the distribution might well have qualified for
capital gain treatment as a partial liquidation. Id. at 647-48.
40. See infra note 76.
41. 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958).
42. 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959).
43. Id. at 798; Idaho Power, 161 F. Supp. at 810.
44. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. Earlier decisions had also
ruled that § 356(a)(2) was to be read in pan materia with § 302. Hawkinson v. Com-
missioner, 235 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1956); Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d
23, 24 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 726 (1946).
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sis.45 The court appeared to take the position that if an ex-
change would have been treated as a dividend if it had pre-
ceded the reorganization then its character should be the
same when it is made in the course of a reorganization.4
This analysis breaks down the reorganization into two
transactions: the shareholder's "intra-corporate" boot ex-
change, to be analyzed under section 302 principles, followed
by his "inter-corporate" tax-free exchanges. Since this ap-
proach ignored those changes in the contours of the "redeem-
ing" shareholders' ownership that resulted from the reorgani-
zation, it was inconsistent with Idaho Power. Thus, the
position of the Court of Claims on dividend equivalency be-
came unclear.
The Tax Court's decision in McDonald v. Commissioner47
appeared to question the validity of bifurcating the reorgani-
zation into two separate exchanges in the manner approved by
the Ross court. A redemption immediately preceding a reor-
ganization was found not essentially equivalent to a dividend
under section 302(b)(1). 4 The Service admitted the existence
of the reorganization," but claimed that the redemption was a
separate transaction which did not satisfy any of the tests
45. After having explicitly rejected the automatic dividend rule, and having
held that § 356(a)(2) was to be read in pari materia with § 302, the Ross Court
stated: "The question is whether a dividend by the [transferor] would have accom-
plished the same result as the distribution of the [boot] by the [transferee]." Ross,
173 F. Supp. at 798. Since the opinion appeared to be based on a determination of
whether the shareholder's interest in the corporation was sufficiently reduced after
the exchange, it is assumed that the court meant to say that the question was
whether a redemption by the transferor, before the reorganization, would have ac-
complished the same result as the distribution of boot by the transferee. Accord
Golub, supra note 34 at 908.
46. Several earlier cases approved the same line of analysis, seeming to reject
the automatic dividend rule. But in each such case the exchange was found to have
the effect of a dividend nevertheless. See, e.g., Hawkinson, 235 F.2d at 751; Kirschen-
baum, 155 F.2d at 24.
47. 52 T.C. 82 (1969).
48. The tax court's acceptance of the applicability of § 302 to the exchange of
stock for a distribution of property seems at odds with its analysis in American Mfg.
v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970). There, the tax court held that an exchange of
stock for boot in the course of a reorganization should be characterized under I.R.C. §
356 (1976) rather than I.R.C. § 301 (1976 & Supp. IV 1977-1981). Id. at 214-31. It
appears that § 356(a)(2) was not raised in McDonald by the government or by the
taxpayer.
49. The Service later changed its mind and claimed that a taxable sale, rather
than a reorganization had taken place. Rev. Rul. 75-360, 1975-2 C.B. 110. The Service
may have been implying that a redemption divesting the corporation of earnings and
profits had not taken place.
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under section 302(b) for sale or exchange treatment. In hold-
ing that a substantial change in ownership had taken place,
the Tax Court noted that the redemption and the reorganiza-
tion were merely steps in an integrated plan. Under the doc-
trine of Zenz v. Quinlivan,50 only the final results of the plan
were significant for the determination of dividend
equivalency.
As a result of the contrary interpretations by McDonald
and Zenz courts, the Ross court's reading section 356(a)(2) in
pari materia with section 302 became subject to the question.
If section 302 was read to take into consideration those
changes in the redeeming shareholder's ownership that result
from the reorganization, then section 356(a)(2) must a fortiori
do no less.
In 1973, a court for the first time interpreted section
356(a)(2) as requiring the application of section 302 tests to a
post-reorganization, constructive redemption of the acquiring
corporation's stock. The Eighth Circuit held in Wright v.
United States"' that reading section 356(a)(2) and section 302
in pari materia mandate the use of the "net effect" standard
explained in Zenz v. Quinlivan52 Courts had long held that
the extent of the reduction in the shareholder's economic
ownership and voting power determined the character of his
exchange of stock for boot. The most important and novel fea-
ture of the Wright decision was its ruling that the "net effect"
standard required consideration of the reorganization's impact
on the reductions to be measured. The Eighth Circuit be-
lieved that only a post-reorganization, constructive redemp-
tion analysis could properly factor in the impact of the reor-
ganization. The court held that the taxpayer's exchange of
stock for a note resulted in a "meaningful change" in his pro-
portionate interest in the corporation. The distribution of the
note was "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" under sec-
tion 302(b)(1) and did not have "the effect of a dividend"
under section 356(a)(2).15
50. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
51. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'g 29 A.F.T.R. 2d 72-1466 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
52. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954) (holding that the net effect of a redemption
followed by a sale, where both exchanges were part of one integrated transaction, was
a sufficient reduction in ownership to qualify the redemption for capital gain
treatment).
53. Wright, 482 F.2d at 610.
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The taxpayer in Wright owned 99.2% of one corporation
and 56% of another before their consolidation into a new cor-
poration in which he had a 61.7 % interest. In order to create
the desired proportions of ownership, the taxpayer received a
distribution of boot and the other major shareholder gave the
consolidated corporation a promissory note in exchange for
some of his stock. The taxpayer lost the complete control he
formerly had and suffered a 23.3% reduction in his right to
dividends and assets on liquidation.5 4
The Eighth Circuit justified its application of the section
302 tests to the consolidated corporation by noting that it
would be artificial to view the boot as coming separately from
one of the preconsolidated corporations. They had been dis-
solved as part of the plan of reorganization and a redemption
analysis makes sense only in relation to a corporation that will
continue to exist. The court mentioned in a footnote that the
distribution was not a pro rata one since the taxpayer received
his distribution in his capacity as a shareholder in the consoli-
dated corporation. 8
The Wright court also held that the boot should be re-
garded as having come from the consolidated enterprise,
rather than from one of its corporate components, since the
reorganization was based on the coporations' combined capital
accounts. It would therefore have been immaterial if one of
the pre-merger corporate components, rather than the consoli-
dated corporation, had issued the note. The court logically
found that the boot was distributed in exchange for a stock
interest in the consolidated corporation that the taxpayer
would have received if the reorganization had been free of
boot."
It is noteworthy that the Wright court might have found
that the distribution had the effect of a dividend if the Ser-
vice had only argued that the constructive ownership rules of
section 3185 applied. The dissent objected that they should
logically apply to section 356(a)(2) since the court was con-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 608 n.16.
56. Id. at 607.
57. I.R.C. § 318 (1976) makes related persons the constructive owners of each
other's stock. This prevents related persons who control a corporation from bailing
out earnings at capital gains rates through redemptions which effect no meaningful
change in their respective ownership.
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struing it in pari materia with section 302.58 But the majority
refused to consider section 318 since the Service had failed to
claim its applicability."
The Service was quick to reject the Wright decision for
its refusal to treat the distribution of boot as though it has
been made by the acquired or transferor corporation. In Reve-
nue Ruling 75-83,0 the Service reaffirmed its recent retreat
from Bedford's automatic dividend rule,"' but aligned itself
against the Eighth Circuit with those courts that had deter-
mined dividend equivalency under section 302 principles. The
example used in the 1924 Hypothetical was cited as mandat-
ing a bifurcated analysis which accorded distributions the
same character they would have had if they had been made
before the reorganization, but without any relation to it.2
In 1978, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the service in
Shimberg, Jr. v. United States' that the character of an ex-
change should not be altered because it is part of a reorgani-
zation."4 The district court had held that an exchange of stock
for boot did not have the effect of a dividend. The analysis
which the appellate court offered to justify its reversal of the
district court's holding, that an exchange of stock for boot did
not have the effect of a dividend, appeared to be a return to
58. Wright, 482 F.2d at 610-13 (Bright, J., dissenting). See supra note 57.
59. The Eighth Circuit had recently held that the Service's failure to raise theo-
ries, code sections, or regulations on which it relied before or at trial denied the tax-
payer fair notice and an adequate opportunity to defend against presumptively cor-
rect deficiency assessments. The court's unwillingness to ignore that decision should
not be taken as a rejection of the applicability of § 318 to § 356(a)(2).
60. Rev. Rul. 83, 1975-1 C.B. 112.
61. See Rev. Rul. 515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; Rev. Rul. 516, 1974-2 C.B. 121.
62. The Service's conclusion that a bifurcated analysis followed from the exam-
ple of the 1924 Hypothetical was not explained and the contrary implications of the
Zenz and McDonald decisions were not considered. See supra notes 19-22, 47-49 and
accompanying text.
A few months earlier, however, the Service had issued another ruling that effec-
tively re-opened the door for a return to the automatic dividend rule. In Revenue
Ruling 74-516, the Service "explained" that the principles developed under section
302 may only "in appropriate cases" serve as useful guidelines in applying 356(a)(2)
to a distribution. Under the vague drafting of the ruling, the Service had the unbri-
dled freedom to decide whether a taxpayer's distribution was an "appropriate case."
Rev. Rul. 515, 1974-2 C.B. 121; see also Rev. Rul. 515, 1974-2 C.B. 118.
63. 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
64. Id. at 289. The 1924 Hypothetical ostensibly made it clear that this was
Congress' intent. In a baseless comparison, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the facts
in Shimberg were virtually identical to those of the 1924 Hypothetical. Id. at 289
n.16.
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the automatic dividend rule."' The court pointed out that it
was dealing with a distribution that it considered pro rata,
and denied that it was embracing the discredited Bedford
rule. The court's ratio decidendi seemed to indicate other-
wise. Its precedential value is therefore subject to question.
In Shimberg, a construction company in which the tax-
payer and his wife owned a 68.4% interest merged into an un-
related, diversified holding corporation. Under an arrange-
ment analogous to A's and B's transfer of their vegetable
wholesaling business to the Y conglomerate, 0 the sharehold-
ers of the acquired corporation received boot and a pro rata
share of stock in the acquiring corporation. The district court,
in a misguided attempt to employ the Wright test, errone-
ously compared the taxpayer's ownership in the construction
company with his post-merger actual proportionate ownership
in the holding company. Had it correctly applied the Wright
test, the court would have compared the taxpayer's pre-organ-
ization constructive ownership in the holding company with
his post-merger actual proportionate ownership in it. Having
found a 23% reduction, the district court concluded that the
taxpayer's hypothetical redemption was not essentially
equivalent to a dividend under section 356(a)(2), as viewed
through the principles of section 302(b)(1).
The Fifth Circuit, apparently unaware that the district
court incorrectly applied the Wright court's test, overreacted.
It noted that the taxpayer in Shimberg never held an interest
before the reorganization in the very corporation whose stock
the district court considered hypothetically redeemed.67 The
65. See Fassler, supra note 12; Note, supra note 12; Hurley, Capital Gain Pos-
sibilities for Boot in Acquisitive Reorganizations Lessened by Shimberg Case, 50 J.
TAX 334 (1979); Thurston, Determining Dividend Equivalence of "Boot" Received in
Corporate Reorganization, 32 TAx LAW. 834 (1979); Note, Treatment of Cash Distri-
butions to Shareholders Pursuant to Corporate Reorganization, 20 B.C.L. REV. 601
(1979); Note, Distribution of Boot to Shareholders of Merged Corporation Taxable
as Dividend, Not Capital Gain, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1059.
66. See supra text accompanying note 8.
67. This point was also raised in a recent article which supported, under certain
circumstances, the position that the acquired corporation should be treated as the
one making the distribution. Additional objections were that the shareholder may not
have had the option of receiving the additional stock in the acquiring corporation,
that the shareholders of the acquiring corporation may have insisted that boot be
distributed, and that it would be mere guesswork to predict the kind and quality of
stock that the shareholder would have received but for the distribution of boot.
Samansky, supra note 20 at 29, 49-50. The problem with the first two objections is
that they could apply equally well to the approach which views the acquired corpora-
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court perceived this as a significant feature distinguishing the
case from Wright and supporting the conclusion that a re-
demption analysis was inapplicable to the Shimberg transac-
tion. The Fifth Circuit did not express an opinion on whether
Wright itself was correctly decided.
The Shimberg decision was notable because it rejected
the applicability of any form of redemption analysis to the
characterization of boot received in an acquisitive reorganiza-
tion. The ruling was also the most recent one to refuse to read
section 302 and section 356(a)(2) in pari materia. The ac-
quired corporation in Shimberg had enough accumulated
E&P to cover the distribution and it seemed that the ex-
change of stock for boot was therefore held to have the effect
of a dividend.
Since the Fifth Circuit did not explicitly state the
grounds for its rejection of the rule that section 356(a)(2) is to
be read in pari materia with section 302, the rationale for the
court's holding that neither a meaningful reduction in owner-
ship nor a reduction in control are at issue cannot be ana-
lyzed. The case appears to lack any analytic basis other than a
presumption that a distribution is out of E&P to the extent
thereof. It can only be regarded as a retrogression to the dis-
credited automatic dividend rule." The Fifth Circuit's holding
is indicative of the confusion that exists with respect to the
proper test for determination of "dividend equivalency."
tion as the corporation distributing the boot. Giving tax effect to considerations such
as those would encourage collusive "refusals" to distribute additional stock rather
than additional boot. The third issue could be dealt with effectively by a presumption
that the shareholder received stock in the transferee having the same character and
value as the stock he formerly had in the transferor; but only to the extent that his
actual ownership in the transferee is not inconsistent with such constructive owner-
ship. See infra note 124.
68. In another recent case, the Fifth Circuit appeared to take another step back
in the direction of the automatic dividend rule. The court stated: "Since at the time
of this distribution [the transferor's] accumulated earnings and profits exceeded the
cash distributed to [its] shareholders, under Shimberg the cash 'boot' so distributed
to them 'had the effect of a dividend,' section 356(a)(2) (see also I.R.C. § 316(a)
(1976)), and was thus included in gross income, section 301(c)." General Housewares
Corp. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Sellers, Jr. v. United
States, 615 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1980).
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B. Analysis of the Tests for "Dividend Equivalency"
1. Typology of Tests's
The various approaches to dividend equivalency under
section 356(a)(2) may most clearly be viewed in the context of
a hypothetical reorganization such as the one posited above
for A and B.70
a. Section 304 Analysis
Some limited controversy has centered on the applicabil-
ity of section 30471 to stock for boot exchanges made in the
course of the reorganization of corporations under common
control.7 2 The terms of section 304 do not describe any of the
exchanges listed in section 356(a)(2) without a strained read-
ing of one or the other statute.7 1 Still, a hypothetical transac-
69. It should be noted at the outset that the Treasury has in its arsenal a
vaguely drafted provision, Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(1) (1979), which provides an addi-
tional framework for finding that boot is essentially equivalent to a dividend. When
applied to an acquisitive reorganization, the regulation simply characterizes the boot
distribution as a separate transaction which is independent from the reorganization
and therefore governed by § 301. Section 356(a)(2) thus becomes irrelevant since it
applies only to the property received as part of a plan of reorganization. The status is
significant since § 356(a)(2) limits dividend treatment to the lesser of the gain real-
ized or the shareholder's ratable share of earnings and profits. Section 301, on the
other hand, has no such limitation. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1 (1979) is a codification of a
position taken by the Supreme Court in Bazely v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947),
and Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1934), with respect to recapitalizations and
to incorporations lacking in economic substance. While the danger exists that any
distribution of boot could be regarded as separate and independent from the reorgan-
ization exchange, the regulation indicates that it will generally apply to recapitaliza-
tions, mergers into empty shell corporations, and to reincorporations. It should not
present a significant threat in the case of an acquisitive reorganization unless the
surviving corporation appears to be so lacking in assets that it was acquired solely for
the use of its shell or its tax attributes. But see infra notes 141-45 and accompanying
text.
70. See supra text accompanying note 8.
71. I.R.C. § 304 (1976) prevents a shareholder from bailing out dividends of
commonly controlled corporations at capital gain rates by selling to one corporation
stock that he owns in the other. The proceeds of the "sale" are treated as a dividend
under § 304.
72. Kempf, Section 304 of the Internal Revenue Code: Unmasking Disguised
Dividends in Related Corporation Transactions, 33 U. CHi. L. REV. 60 (1965);
Marans, Section 304: The Shadowy World of Redemptions through Related Corpora-
tions, 22 TAx L. REV. 161 (1966).
73. Section 304 cannot apply to a type A merger or consolidation because,
among other things, the issuing corporation ceases to exist at the moment of the reor-
ganization and the availability of its earnings and profits for the dividend thus be-
comes problematic. Section 304 cannot apply to a type B reorganization where the
shareholder receives boot in exchange for his old stock because the exchange of his
old stock for boot must be made with the corporation that issued it to him. For the
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tion fitting within the terms of section 304 could theoretically
be employed in order to use section 304's principles in deter-
mining dividend equivalency under section 356(a)(2). Neither
the courts nor the commentators, however, have suggested a
consistent way to fit the two sections together. Section 304
analysis has therefore never been applied to boot in the con-
text of a reorganization.
b. The Automatic Dividend Rule
Under the "automatic dividend rule" established in Com-
missioner v. Estate of Bedford74 the distribution will always
have the "effect of a dividend" so long as there are enough
earnings and profits to cover the distribution. If the automatic
dividend rule were applied to A's boot, he would have to re-
port $20 of dividend income, as he did in the hypothetical re-
organization shown above, and $20 of capital gain. If B were
to exchange ten of his twenty shares for $10, he would have to
recognize a $10 gain under section 356(a)(1). The exchange
would have the "effect of a dividend" according to the auto-
matic dividend rule and B would report $5 of his gain as a
dividend under section 356(a)(2).
c. The District Court's Test in Shimberg
Another test for dividend equivalency was employed by
the district court in Shimberg v. United States.75 The trial
court posited a redemption of stock equal in value to the boot
distributed to the shareholder. It inquired whether the re-
demption constituted a "meaningful reduction" in the share-
holder's corporate ownership or was "substantially dispropor-
tionate" according to the principles developed under section
302. The court compared the percentage of the acquired cor-
poration that the redeemed shareholder owned before the hy-
pothetical redemption with the percentage of the reorganized
entity that he owned after the hypothetical redemption. The
disparity was held great enough to warrant capital gain treat-
ment under section 302 and therefore under section 356(a)(2)
as well.
A's proportionate ownership dropped from 80% of X to
less than one percent of Y. Such a reduction in ownership
would easily satisfy the principles of section 302(b)(1) or sec-
same reason, § 304 cannot apply to a type C or type D reorganization. Types E, F,
and G are also immune to § 304.
74. 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
75. 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev'd, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1979).
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tion 302(b)(2) in the context of a single corporation. A's ex-
change of stock for boot in the course of the reorganization
would therefore not have the effect of a dividend under sec-
tion 356(a)(2) according to the district court's test. He would
be entitled to capital gain treatment on the entire $40. If B
exchanged one half of his stock for boot, his corporate owner-
ship would drop from 20% to less than one percent whether
or not A also "redeemed" one-half of his stock. B would also
get pure capital gain treatment.
d. Partial Liquidation Analysis
A fourth possible approach would determine the dividend
equivalence of certain distributions according to the principles
developed under the partial liquidation provisions of section
346.76 Satisfaction of that section's requirement would entitle
the shareholder to pure capital gain treatment."
A partial liquidation analysis might be applied to B's
boot under the following circumstances:. Assume that, instead
of having only a vegetable wholesaling business, X had ten
separate lines of business which it had operated for more than
five years. Y wants to purchase only six lines of business, but
X is unable to liquidate the other four profitably. As part of
the plan of reorganization, Y promptly employs its superior
marketing resources to sell them profitably. Y then distributes
all the proceeds to A, or to both A and B pro rata, in a hypo-
76. I.R.C. § 346 (1976). Some commentators take the position that dividend
equivalency could be tested under the principles of § 346. It has been argued that §
346 is relevant, but only if, as part of the reorganization plan, the acquiring corpora-
tion sells assets to a third party and distributes the proceeds in a manner which
would, absent the reorganization, comply with the requirements of § 346. Samansky,
supra note 20, at 14. It would be unreasonable if a distribution, which would have
qualified as a partial liquidation before the reorganization, were characterized as a
dividend merely because it was made as part of a reorganizing transaction. Several
commentators contend that approval of this approach can be inferred from Lewis v.
Commissioner, 176 F.2d 656 (1st Cir. 1949). See Golub, supra note 34, at 907; Moore,
Taxation of Distributions Made in Connection with a Corporate Reorganization, 17
TAx L. REv. 129, 145-47 (1961). The Service's position on the applicability of § 346 is
unclear. The Service argued in Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 324 U.S. 283
(1945), that the partial liquidation and dividend equivalency rules were completely
dissimilar and that the existence of the partial liquidation in Bedford was therefore
irrelevant. The Service's position in Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.
1949), a partial liquidation case, may have indicated a change of position since the
Service drew support from Bedford in arguing for dividend equivalency. See B. BITT-
KER & J. EUSTIcE, supra note 29, § 14.34, at 14-119. See also Wittenstein, Boot Dis-
tributions under Section 112(c)(2): A Re-Examination, 8 TAx L. REv. 63 (1952).
77. I.R.C. § 302(a) (1976).
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thetical redemption of their stock. A section 302(b)(4) analysis
would support capital gain treatment. The distribution would
be attributable to X's ceasing to conduct a business; X, now
submerged in Y, would be actively engaged in a business im-
mediately after the distribution; and all of the businesses in-
volved would have been owned and operated by X for more
than five years preceding the distribution.78
Decisions hinging on a section 302(b)(4) analysis have not
come down. At least one opinion, however, suggested that a
court might have entertained a partial liquidation analysis in
testing for dividend equivalency under section 356(a)(2), if the
taxpayer had raised the argument.79
e. Revenue Ruling 75-83
A fifth test, approved by the Service in Revenue Ruling
75-83, postulates a hypothetical redemption of the stock of
the target corporation."0 The redemption occurs before the re-
organization. If the stock redeemed would be equal in value to
the boot received, and if the redemption would have qualified
for sale or exchange treatment under section 302 had the reor-
ganization not taken place, then the distribution of boot will
not be deemed to have the effect of a dividend."1
Returning to A's transaction, his exchange would have
the "effect of a dividend." A redemption of 40 of his shares
before the reorganization would have left him owning 661/3 %
of X. Since his exchange would have been treated as a divi-
dend under section 302(d) had it preceded the reorganization,
it will have the same effect when made a part of that transac-
tion. But A will have only $20 worth of dividend income and
78. Section 302(b)(4) provides that a distribution will be treated as received in
partial liquidation, so long as the distribution is pursuant to a plan, occurs within the
taxable year in which the plan is adopted or the succeeding taxable year, and the
following requirements are met: "(1) [tjhe distribution must be attributable to the
corporation's ceasing to conduct, or must consist of the assets of, a trade or business;
(2) [-Immediately after the distribution, the distributing corporation must be actively
engaged in a trade or business; (3) [b]oth the retained trade or business and the one
which was distributed (or which gave rise to the distribution) must have been actively
conducted (although not necessarily by the distributing corporation) throughout the
five-year period preceding the distribution; and (4) [n]either trade nor business may
have been acquired by the distributing corporation within the preceding five years in
a transaction in which gain or loss was recognized in whole or in part." I.R.C. §
302(b)(4); B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, at § 9153.
79. Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 650-51 (1st Cir. 1949); see supra notes
37-38.
80. Rev. Rul. 83, 1975-1 C.B. 112.
81. Id. at 113.
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$40 worth of capital gain since the exchange is governed by
section 356(a)(2).
. If instead of A, B exchanged one-half of his stock for boot
and a reorganization did not take place, the redemption would
reduce his ownership of X from 20% to 11%. The $10 would
qualify for sale or exchange treatment under section 302(b)(2)
and would therefore not have the "effect of a dividend" under
section 356(a)(2). The entire amount of the boot would be rec-
ognized as capital gain.
If A sells one-half of his stock to Y for cash at the same
time as B, neither exchange will have the effect of a dividend.
A pro rata redemption of one-half of both shareholders' stock
before the reorganization would have been treated as a divi-
dend under section 302(d), and will therefore have the same
character under section 356(a)(2).
f. The Wright Test
The Eighth Circuit chose a different course in Wright v.
United States.82 The court held that dividend equivalence
should be determined by hypothesizing a post-reorganization
redemption. The shareholders of the acquired corporation are
deemed to have first made a boot-free exchange of stock and
securities in the acquired corporation for stock and securities
in the reorganized entity. An amount of stock in the reorga-
nized corporation equal in value to the boot is deemed subse-
quently redeemed and tested under section 302 principles.8"
A redemption of Y stock after a boot-free exchange by A
results in a drop in ownership from approximately 0.8% to
approximately 0.4%. This is a fifty percent reduction which
qualifies under section 302(b)(2). Hence, the Wright court's
approach would generate the result that the distribution of
boot did not have the effect of a dividend to A. The entire $10
would be recognized as capital gain. Moreover, even if B had
also received cash for one half of his X stock, both former
shareholders' ownership in Y would have hypothetically
dropped by almost 50%. Since the hypothetical redemption of
their stock would not be a pro rata distribution to them in
their capacity as Y shareholders, both distributions would
qualify for capital gain treatment under section 302 and sec-
tion 356(a)(2). An analysis of the various tests enumerated
82. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973) aff'g 29 A.F.T.R. 2d 72-1466 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
83. Id. at 607-08.
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above will demonstrate that the Wright test is the only ade-
quate approach and should be followed by the courts.
2. Analysis of "Dividend Equivalency" Tests
a. The Automatic Dividend Rule
Bedford's interpretation of section 356(a)(2) rests on the
assumption that Congress intended that dividend treatment
should result only "[if] an exchange . . . has the effect of the
distribution of a dividend," since Congress was unable to de-
vise a less convoluted way of saying that all distributions
should have the effect of a dividend. This approach is gener-
ally thought to be without merit.8"
The weaknesses of the automatic dividend rule extend
beyond the need for a convoluted interpretation of the word
"if." Treasury Regulation section 1.1002-1(c) sanctions the
view of a reorganization as a "mere adjustment in the form of
investment."86 This perspective raises the possibility of treat-
ing the boot purely as payment in redemption of stock, rather
than partly as a distribution of property to A or B in their
capacity as shareholders.8
Requiring B to treat as a dividend the transformation of
one half of his X stock into cash is patently unfair. His three
critical shareholder rights, as identified by Himmel v. Com-
missioner,"8 have been drastically reduced. His right to exer-
cise voting power has been cut by more than half. Moreover,
his rights to dividends and to assets on liquidation have been
reduced by one half. Had such a redemption occurred long
84. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
85. See Wright, 482 F.2d 600; Darrel, supra note 33; Fassler, supra note 12;
Gerson, Boot Dividends and the Automatic Dividend Rule: Bedford Revisited, 11
WM. & MARY L. REV. 841 (1970); Moore, supra note 76; Shoulson, supra note 20;
Wittenstein, supra note 76.
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1980).
87. Thus, if the reorganization is viewed as adjusting the form, but not the na-
ture of a shareholder's investment, the principles of § 302 should continue to be avail-
able to characterize the shareholder's exchange of his stock for a distribution of prop-
erty. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
88. 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964). The court defined a shareholder's interest as
including: (1) the right to vote and thereby exercise control; (2) the right to partici-
pate in current earnings and accumulated surplus; and (3) the right to share in net
assets on liquidation. The court held that a redemption sufficiently reducing these
rights may result in a "meaningful reduction" in a shareholder's proportionate inter-
est in the corporation, and thereby qualify the redemption as "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend" under I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) (1976). See Rev. Rul. 502, 1975-2
C.B. 111.
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enough before the merger B would unquestionably have been
entitled to sale or exchange treatment under section
302(b)(2).
b. The District Court's Test in Shimberg
While the automatic dividend approach may be faulted
for ignoring the sale aspect of a reorganization in determining
the character of a distribution, the test employed by the dis-
trict court in Shimberg" overemphasizes the sale approach.
Whenever a small business is merged into a large conglomer-
ate, the district court's test will generate the result that the
taxpayer suffered a meaningful reduction in ownership. His
proportionate ownership in the conglomerate will always be
substantially less than the proportionate ownership he had in
his business before. Applied to such reorganizations, the dis-
trict court's redemption analysis will invariably give the
shareholder's exchange of stock for boot a capital gain treat-
ment. The role of the reorganization as a "readjustment of a
continuing interest in property under modified corporate
form"'90. will be disregarded in such reorganizations since no
exchange could possibly have the effect of a dividend. This
approach also effectively eliminates the requirement that a re-
demption, whether hypothetical or actual, must effect a sub-
stantial reduction in the value of one's corporate investment
in order to qualify for capital gain treatment. 1 The surrender
of an insignificant amount of stock for boot could otherwise
result in capital gain." As the Fifth Circuit noted in reversing
the district court's decision, section 356(a)(2) could thus be
effectively read out of the Code.e" The district court's test has
never been used again.
Thus, both Bedford's automatic dividend rule and the
district court's approach in Shimberg tend each to overem-
phasize one aspect of a reorganization. This renders them
both of little use in interpreting the terms of section 356, and
underscores the need for an approach that deals effectively
and consistently with the dual nature of a reorganization.
89. 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev'd, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1979); see
supra note 75 and accompanying text.
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1980) (emphasis added).
91. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(C) (1976).
92. See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, § 9.01.
93. Shimberg, 415 F. Supp. 832.
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c. Partial Liquidation Analysis9 4
The applicability of a section 346 analysis to an exchange
of stock for boot in a reorganization will always be uncertain
and the Service can be relied on to argue for dividend
equivalency. If the trades or businesses sold are not disposed
of simultaneously with the reorganization or soon thereafter,
the Service will probably claim that the sale was unrelated to
the boot. The taxpayer will, moreover, bear the burden of
showing that the boot consisted of proceeds from the "partial
liquidation" rather than an unrelated distribution of
earnings. 5
Even if he passes those and other hurdles, the share-
holder arguing for partial liquidation treatment will probably
face a hostile judicial climate. The courts have never applied a
section 346 analysis to a section 356(a)(2) setting. Further-
more, dictum in Bedford indicated that the Supreme Court
felt that the two provisions were entirely unrelated."
Corporations generally effect the partial liquidation
before the reorganization rather than face the probability that
a pro rata distribution of boot in a reorganization would be
held to have the effect of a dividend. This technique is rela-
tively safe and advisable. It should be noted that the Service
could claim that the partial liquidation and the merger were
all steps in one integrated transaction. This would bring the
distributions back within the purview of section 356(a)(2) re-
sulting in dividend treatment. But the Service has thus far
respected the separateness of partial liquidations followed by
reorganizations and it is unlikely that the Service will change
its position.
d. Revenue Ruling 75-83
Revenue Ruling 75-8397 recognizes the tension between
the two aspects of a reorganization. An exchange of stock for
boot can be purely capital in nature. This favorable treatment
is conditioned on the shareholder's substantially reducing his
overall corporate investment, regardless of which corporation
pays the boot.' 8
94. See supra notes 37-40, 76-79 and accompanying text.
95. See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, ch. 9, pt. E.
96. 325 U.S. 283, 291-92 (1945).
97. Rev. Rul. 83, 1975-1 C.B. 112. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying
text.
98. The ruling stated: "[lt is appropriate to look to principles developed under
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The justification for this analysis is similar to that under-
lying section 302. The shareholder's hypothetical sale of only
a small amount of debt or equity to the acquired or acquiring
corporation will not terminate his continuing status as a
shareholder. The exchange will have little or no influence on
his standing in the new corporation regardless of which corpo-
rate entity pays. If there is no meaningful reduction in both
(1) the value of his investment and (2) his proportionate con-
trol of the corporate structure, as a result of his exchange of
stock for boot, that exchange will not result in a change in the
"kind or extent" 9 of his corporate investment. His boot, in
such cases, cannot be properly viewed as the proceeds from
the sale, back to the corporation, of an interest in property. It
must presumptively be viewed instead as having the effect of
a distribution of earnings and profits.
The hypothetical redemption approach adopted by the
Service in Revenue Ruling 75-83 gives some effect to these le-
gitimate concerns. In determining dividend equivalency, it fo-
cuses on the acquired corporation, typically referred to as the
"target" corporation. The ruling appears to generally incorpo-
rate the technical requirements of section 302 in pari
materia. °00 A 20% reduction in the value of the shareholder's
investment in the corporation is required for capital gain
treatment by the safe harbor provision of section
302(b)(2)(C). The shareholder's proportionate ownership of
the target's total outstanding equity must also drop by at
least 20%, according to that section.
Section 302(b)(2)(B) further requires that ownership of
the target be reduced to a point below 50% voting control.
For example, if X were not undergoing a merger when it re-
deemed 45 of A's shares, A would suffer a more than 20%
§ 302 for determining dividend equivalency." The ruling's reference to Davis v.
United States, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), which adopted the "meaningful reduction" test
for redemptions under § 302(b)(1), indicated that the "meaningful reduction" test
should also apply to boot distributions made in the course of reorganizations.
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1972).
100. The ruling did not expressly state that § 356(a)(2) and § 302 should be
read in pari materia. See supra note 98. In other rulings, the Service has stated that
tests developed for § 302 may "in appropriate cases serve as useful guidelines" for the
purpose of applying § 356(a)(2). Rev. Rul. 516, 1974-2 C.B. 121; Rev. Rul. 515, 1974-2
C.B. 118. In at least one case, however, the Service has argued, and the court has
agreed, that the case was not appropriate for a reading of § 356(a)(2) and § 302 in
pari materia. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1979). See supra note
6 and accompanying text. See also supra note 68.
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drop in ownership but he would still control X. His retention
of the power to manipulate the corporation could preclude a
"meaningful change" in both the absolute and the proportion-
ate value of his interest in X. Unless X redeemed more than
60 of A's shares, the redemption would not qualify for capital
gain treatment under section 302(b)(2) and might fail section
302(b)(1) as well. The 50% requirement thus prevents a cor-
poration from using a mere shuffling of papers to distribute
earnings to its larger shareholders at capital gains rates.
Revenue Ruling 75-83 suffers from certain shortcomings
because it focuses the section 302 tests on the target corpora-
tion. Section 302 was designed to characterize exchanges, be-
tween one corporation only, ("simple redemptions") and one
or more persons who were shareholders of that corporation
immediately before the redemption ("veteran shareholders").
The provision determines whether the redemption of the
shareholder's stock transfers a sufficiently significant interest
in the corporation to the other veteran shareholders of the
corporation. But if X stock is exchanged for boot in the course
of an acquisitive reorganization, there will be a greater num-
ber of shareholders who have an interest in the assets of X at
the tail end of the transaction than there were at the begin-
ning of the deal. Specifically, Y's shareholders will have joined
the corporate enterprise formerly owned exclusively by X's
veteran shareholders. The application of section 302 to a hy-
pothetical redemption of only X's stock ignores the transfer
made to the veteran Y shareholders. This approach cannot
therefore properly reflect the nature and full extent of the in-
direct transfer effected by the redemption.
The errors that result from applying section 302 to the
issuing corporation are best illustrated by the following hypo-
thetical:101 Assume that X corporation has ten equally valua-
ble lines of business. If X were to simply redeem one half of
A's 80 shares, the exchange would not come near meeting the
requirements of section 302(b)(2)(B) or section 302(b)(2)(C).
The proceeds A received would therefore not qualify for treat-
ment as gain from the sale of an interest in property. The re-
demption of X's stock may be viewed in one of two ways: (1)
The traditional model of a redemption depicts A as relin-
quishing B a percentage of his interest in the assets, earnings
101. See note 8 and accompanying text.
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and profits of each and every line of business that X owns,""2
but in an alternative model (2) the situation in which A origi-
nally owns eight of X's ten lines of business and tranfers some
of them to B.'"
If all ten lines of business are equally valuable and will
remain so, both examples fairly represent the transfer effected
102.
ILLUSTRATION #1
I I i i1 1 j I 1/10I 2/10
This 3/15 of ll O
X belonged to .3/0I I I i /0
A before the A 4/10
redemption. I I I I I 5/10
Now, it 
.6/10belongs to . I Ii /10
'~1/10
B I I I I I I I I 2/lO
10 9.8 7/ 6 5 4 3 2 1
Lines of Business
103. ILLUSTRATION #2
B A
This 3/15 ofI I [
* belonged toI .I [
A before the
redemption. 1 I.
Now, itbelongs to B. I I I I I I I
I I I I I
10 9 '8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Lines of Business
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by the redemption. A's surrender of one half of his stock may
be viewed as the delivery to B of his deed to the small inter-
ests he relinquished to B. In exchange, A caused X to transfer
to himself boot in which B also had an interest.
In both illustrations of a simple redemption, A remained
in control of X after the redemption, despite the fact that the
value of his investment in the reorganized corporation
dropped by one-half. Since B was the only shareholder who
could absorb the proportionate ownership of the corporate en-
terprise that A relinquished, A would have had to sell more
than 75% of his stock to reduce his control of X by more than
50 %. But if he sold 75 % of his stock in the course of the reor-
ganization, he would imperil the continuity of proprietary in-
terest required for the transaction to qualify as a reorganiza-
tion.10 4 Thus, A may find himself in the position of having to
choose between the non-recognition benefits of a reorganiza-
tion status, and the need to liquidate half of his investment at
capital gain rates.
Revenue Ruling 75-83 unreasonably characterizes A's ex-
change though it were a "simple redemption." The ruling im-
poses the same stringent requirements on A when his "re-
demption" occurs in the more complicated context of a
reorganization, even though thousands of Y shareholders are
also available to absorb the proportionate ownership of the
corporate enterprise that A gives up. Notwithstanding the fact
that (1) a hypothetical redemption may reduce the value of
A's corporate investment to less than 50% of what it was
before, and (2) A's proportionate control over the assets re-
maining in the reorganized corporation, 0 5 Revenue Ruling 75-
83 would assign to him a hypothetical amount of control in
excess of 50%. This would violate section 302(b)(2)(B), possi-
104. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1980), one of the requisites to a reorgani-
zation within the meaning of § 368(a) is a continuity of proprietary interest. The
Service stated in Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568, that this requirement will be
satisfied for ruling purposes if one or more former shareholders of the acquired corpo-
ration acquire together stock of the reorganized corporation, or a corporation control-
ling it equal to at least 50% of the value of all the outstanding stock of the acquired
corporation on the date of the reorganization.
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bly resulting in dividend treatment.106 Although section
302(b)(2)(B) is useful in preventing ephemeral reductions in
the ownership of a single corporation from getting capital gain
treatment, Revenue Ruling 75-83 focuses that provision's test
on the wrong corporation, namely, the target corporation.
This approach to "redemptions" made in the course of reorga-
nizations creates the harsh result that A is treated as though
he received a dividend.
On the other hand, the Service's application of the sec-
tion 302 tests to the issuing corporations also creates a loop-
hole for bail-outs. Shareholders having stock in both X and Y
get favored treatment since the avoidance of dividend
equivalency is conditioned on a proportionate reduction in
ownership with respect to the shareholders of the target cor-
poration only. For example, if A owned 80% of Y before the
reorganization, the sale of one half or even three quarters of
his relatively small holdings in X would result in a meaning-
less reduction in his overall corporate investment. Revenue
Ruling 75-83 would effectively encourage A to separately in-
corporate a vegetable purchasing division to supply his Y Cor-
105.
ILLUSTRATION #3
B A Veteran Shareholders of Y
i l iII III I4
II III , i I
I II I Ild
10 9 87 65 4 32 1
Y's Lines of Business
X's Lines of Business These 4 lines of business
belonged to A before the
hypothetical redemption.
Now, they belong to the
Veteran Shareholders of
Y.
106. The redemption might qualify for capital gain treatment under §
302(b)(1), depending on the facts and circumstances. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1978).
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poration supermarket chain. He could plan to merge it into Y
several years down the road and thereby bail-out earnings and
profits at capital gains rates. Despite this result, Revenue Rul-
ing 75-83 would find no dividend equivalency. The ruling's fo-
cus on a hypothetical proportionate reduction of control of
the acquired corporation creates unduly harsh or unduly leni-
ent results, depending on the existence or absence of common
ownership.
The shortcomings of Revenue Ruling 75-83 are also par-
ticularly apparent when the shareholders of the target corpo-
ration receive what the ruling terms a "pro rata" distribution
of boot. A pro rata redemption should always be treated as
essentially equivalent to a dividend in the context of a single
corporation, unless the requirements for a partial liquidation
are met. This rule prevents the bailing out of E&P. An ex-
change of the acquired corporation's stock for boot in the
course of a reorganization is, however, a different transaction
and should not be analogized to a redemption by the acquired
corporation. Several of the errors that result from such an ap-
proach would be particularly apparent if every shareholder in
tiny X Corporation sold one-half of his stock to conglomerate
Y for boot in the course of the merger.1 07 X's shareholders
would each have (1) reduced the value of their corporate in-
vestment by 20 or even 50 percent; and (2) drastically reduced
their proportionate control of X's assets because Y's veteran
shareholders would absorb the interests relinquished via the
exchange of stock for boot. Furthermore, the veteran share-
holder of Y would control the entire enterprise.108 The re-
quirements of section 302 would thus have been satisfied in
principle. Nevertheless, Revenue Ruling 75-83 will only note
that each "redeeming" shareholder's proportionate ownership
has not dropped with respect to X's other former shareholder.
Refusing, therefore, to admit the sale nature of the exchange
of stock for boot, the Service would claim that the distribu-
tion of boot had the effect of a dividend.
The unreasonableness of the Service's position on "pro
rata" exchanges of stock for boot is underscored by Revenue
107. Rev. Rul. 75-83 terms this transaction a "pro rate" distribution of boot.
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Ruling 66-365.109 The Service admitted that not all pro rata
hypothetical redemptions have the effect of a dividend. The
ruling inexplicably allowed capital gain treatment so long as
the exchange of stock for boot was necessary to avoid the issu-
ance of fractional shares and was not separately bargained for.
While the Service recognized that not all pro rata exchanges
are equivalent to a dividend, the theoretical underpinnings for
the conditions that the Service imposed on capital gain treat-
ment remain unexplained.110
ILLUSTRATION #4
108.
B A Veteran Shareholders of Y
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belonged to B before belonged to A before the
the hypothetical re- hypothetical redemption.
demption. Now, it Now, they belong to the
belongs to the Veter- Veteran Shareholders of
an Shareholders of Y. Y.
109. Rev. Rul. 365, 1966-2 C.B. 116.
110. Theoretically speaking, the position taken in Rev. Rul. 66-365 is erroneous.
Under the meaningful reduction test, cash paid by the acquiring corporation to the
shareholders of the acquired corporation in lieu of fractional shares will always have
the effect of a dividend. The pre-reorganization, hypothetical redemption of stock in
the acquired corporation will probably never come close to meeting the 20% require-
ment of § 302(b)(2)(C). But from a practical perspective, a contrary result would gen-
erate undesirable results, compelling the acquiring corporation to incur the inordinate
expense and inconvenience of issuing and transferring fractional shares. See also
Mills v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1964); Rev. Proc. 41, 1977-2 C.B. 574.
The need for such an administrative exception to the dividend consequences that a
strict "meaningful reduction" analysis entails, adds plausibility to the Service's posi-
tion that § 302 principles should only be applied in appropriate cases. See Rev. Rul.
516, 1974-2 C.B. 121.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
e. The Wright Test As a Solution
The Wright test"' attempts to deal with the same con-
cerns that spawned Revenue Ruling 75-83, and in doing so it
shifts the application of section 302 principles to changes in
the ownership of the acquiring corporation. This approach
has several advantages.
Under Revenue Ruling 75-83, A would have to sell sixty-
one of his shares in X for boot in order to have his boot taxed
at capital gain rates. If he sold any fewer shares for boot, he
would fail the 50% requirement of section 302(b)(2)(B).
Under Wright, by contrast, section 302(b)(2)(B) will pose no
threat to him in his capacity as a Y shareholder. His owner-
ship in the Y conglomerate, a corporation worth 100 times X,
would not have reached the 50% control mark even if he had
exchanged his X stock solely for Y stock. Therefore, he need
only reduce by 20% the value of his corporate holding and his
hypothetical control in Y."' He would not be forced to sell
more than sixteen shares for boot in order to get capital gain
treatment merely because he had once been a controlling
shareholder in X.
On the other hand, if A owned 80% of Y before the reor-
ganization, exchange of sixty-one shares in X for boot would
reduce his overall corporate ownership by less than 1% and
would quite properly fail to meet the 20% requirement of sec-
tion 302(b)(2)(C). Even if such a controlling shareholder were
to simultaneously redeem enough Y stock to effect a 20% to-
tal reduction in ownership, his exchanges still would not qual-
ify for capital gain treatment. He would fail the 50% require-
ment of section 302(b)(2)(B), imposed in the multicorporate
context where it is meaningful. Similarly, if B owned 80% of
Y, he could not obtain capital gain treatment on the exchange
of less than 1% of his stock for boot. The loophole that Reve-
nue Ruling 75-83 has left open for shareholders holding stock
in more than one of the reorganizing corporations is thus
closed by the Wright test.
Certain distributions that Revenue Ruling 75-83 inappro-
priately treats as pro rata dividends escape this treatment
under Wright. For example, A and B may each sell one half of
111. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
112. See infra note 124. If more than one class of stock is outstanding, then
capital gain treatment would also be conditioned on the additional safe harbor re-
quirement of a 20% reduction in total stock ownership.
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their stock to Y for cash and both get capital gain treatment.
Having both suffered (1) a more than 20% reduction in the
value of their stock and (2) a greater than 20% reduction in
their control of the corporate enterprise, there is no reason
why they should be denied the capital gain treatment that
section 302 principle would afford either of them had the
other not "redeemed" any stock in the course of the reorgani-
zation. Their redemptions will both be substantially dispro-
portionate in the context of Y since the hypothetical exchange
of one half of their Y stock for boot will not be a pro rata
redemption of every Y shareholder's stock.11
Each shareholder may be regarded as having sold so sig-
nificant a portion of his investment that the exchanges would
have qualified for capital gain treatment, if only the two
shareholders had waited until the reorganization was old and
cold before redeeming. Imposing dividend treatment when the
reorganization and partial cash-outs occurred simultaneously
serves no statutory purpose. Wright prevents this injustice.
The Wright approach appears to treat a shareholder more
favorably to the extent that he owns a greater percentage of
the target corporation. B who owns a mere 20% of X, must
exchange at least five of his twenty shares for boot in order to
avoid dividend equivalency. The demands put upon him will
not change whether the "effect of a dividend" is determined
under Revenue Ruling 75-83 or under Wright.
As the net worth of Y increases with respect to X's net
worth, the number of shares of X that A or C must exchange
for boot in order to avoid dividend equivalency will drop and
approach the number of shares whose sale would effect a 20%
drop in the value of their holdings.11 4
If C owned 60 % of X, he would have to take at least $24
worth of his investment out of the corporate solution in order
to get sale or exchange treatment applied to all his boot under
Revenue Ruling 75-83, whatever the size of Y. But if X were
merging into a Y that was one half the size of X, C would only
have to sell $18 worth of his investment for boot; there would
be a $6 or 25% reduction in the requirements he would have
to meet to avoid dividend equivalency.
113. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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A, an 80% shareholder, may appear to be treated even
more favorably than C under the Wright test. He would have
to sell 61 shares for boot in order to get sale or exchange
treatment under Revenue Ruling 75-83. But if X were to
merge into a Y Corporation whose net worth was one half of
X's, A would only have to sell 28 shares of X for boot under
Number of
dollars that
must be
taken out of
corporate solu-
tion in order
to avoid
dividend
equivalence
under:
(1) Revenue
Ruling
75-83;
(2) Revenue
Ruling
75-83
without
the "50%
require-
ment";
(3) Wright
251 .- 4
(3) Wright
80% shareholder ofX(Mr. A
60% shareholder of X (Mr. C.)
e 20% shareholder of X (Mr. B.)
\...............
(i) (6) X Ix 5X lox IOOX
NET WORTH OF Y EXPRESSED
AS A MULTIPLE OF X's NET WORTH
NOTE: This chart assumes that:
(1) Both X's and Y's shares have a fair market value
of $1.00;
(2) X had 100 shares outstanding at the time of the
merger;
(3) None of the "redeeming" shareholders of X owned
any stock in Y before the merger.
! J | | z
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Wright. He could thus retain $17, or 37% of the stock that
Revenue Ruling 75-83 would have required him to liquidate in
order to get capital gain treatment. Dividend equivalency
could thus be avoided at a relatively small cost to the
taxpayer.
Wright's "leniency" increases with the net worth of Y.,,5
115.
P (N) = W
P = That
percentage
on "N"
shares which
may
be retained
in
corporate
solution
under
Wright
without
incurring
dividend
equivalency.
N=The minimum
number of
shares that
must be ex-
changed for
boot under
Rev. Rul. 75-83
in order to
avoid dividend
equivalency.
Wr=The number of
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of invest-
ment that may
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corporate solu-
tion without
incurring
dividend
equivalency
because Wright
was used
rather than
Rev. Rul. 75-83.
80% shareholder of X (Mr. A)
.60% shareholder of X (Mr. C)
shareholder of X (Mr. B)
X 1x
NET WORTH OF Y EXPRESSED
AS A MULTIPLE OF X's NET WORTH
NOTE: This chart assumes that:
(1) Both X's and Y's shares have a fair mar-
ket value of $1.00;
(2) X had 100 shares outstanding at the time
of the merger;
(3) None of the "redeeming" shareholders of X
owned any stock in Y before the reorgani-
zation.
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B, the 20% shareholder, will have to redeem five shares no
matter how large or small Y is. But if Y's net worth is
doubled, making it equal in value to X, C, the 60% share-
holder, need only take sixteen shares out of corporate solu-
tion;116 the result is in a drop of 33% from the twenty-four
share redemption requirement of Revenue Ruling 75-83. If Y's
net worth increases to ten times that of X, 46% of the stock
that C would have been required to sell under Revenue Ruling
75-83 may now be kept in corporate solution without any dan-
ger of dividend equivalency.
A's requirements drop from the sixty-one shares neces-
sary under Revenue Ruling 75-83 to thirty-seven shares under
Wright if Y is equal in value to X. Utilizing the Wright test
enables A to keep in corporate solution 61% of the shares that
he would have otherwise been required to liquidate under
Revenue Ruling 75-83. If Y is worth ten times X, he may keep
73% of those shares in corporate solution.
The Service obviously objects to Wright's focus on
changes in the ownership of the acquiring corporation."1
7 If
the Wright approach is followed, there will clearly be a loss of
revenue from certain reorganizations. The pool of sharehold-
ers in which the redeeming shareholder can drown the propor-
tionate interest he relinquishes will always be smaller under
Revenue Ruling 75-83 than it is under Wright. On the other
hand, any potential losses may well be recouped by the in-
creased dividend exposure to redeeming shareholders who
have holdings in both corporations.
The Wright test does not unduly favor giving capital gain
treatment to any shareholder. It simply avoids the tendency
of Revenue Ruling 75-83 to quixotically discriminate against
shareholders who own a large proportion of the target,"' and
leave open loopholes for shareholders with holdings in both
the target and the acquiring corporation."19 Wright, by con-
trast, treats redemptions in a manner that appears logically
116. "Corporate solution" refers to the reorganized corporation.
117. In Rev. Rul. 83, 1975-1 C.B. 112, the Service stated that it did not believe
the McDonald case to be an "appropriate precedent" because the Service believed
that the Tax Court had erred in distinguishing a long line of cases that had held that,
regardless of which corporation makes the distribution, the amount of the dividend is
measured by reference to the earnings and profits of the transferor.
118. See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
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consistent when viewed through the principles of section 302.
It does so by following the opinion of most courts that section
302 and section 356(a)(2) are so intimately related that they
should be read in pari materia.1 20
There are historical and logical reasons for reading sec-
tion 302 and section 356(a)(2) in pari materia. Both provi-
sions were enacted before Congress settled on the policies for
redemptions that are now clearly stated in the safe harbor
provision, section 302(b)(2). In a section 302 context, the issu-
ing corporation buys stock back from the shareholder. Simi-
larly, under a section 356(a)(2) redemption, the issuing corpo-
ration repurchases stock from the shareholder. It does so by
merging, in effect, into the corporation that exchanges a dis-
tribution of property for the stock surrendered.
Since section 302 was designed to characterize exchanges
within a single corporation, and section 356(a)(2) was enacted
to deal with exchanges made pursuant to a plan of reorganiza-
tion, it would be anomalous were the latter provision the only
one that ignored the reorganization in characterizing the boot.
If a redemption is made before a reorganization and is charac-
terized under section 302, the analysis must take the reorgani-
zation into account under McDonald."2 ' Yet the approach to
section 356(a)(2) taken in Revenue Ruling 75-83 ignores the
reorganization. It disregards the fact that exchanges of stock
for boot are often a condition sine qua non for the reorganiza-
tion and must be a part of the reorganization in order to be
within the purview of section 356(a)(2). It is unreasonable to
conclude that Congress decided to characterize them as
though the reorganization did not occur.
Wright rationally takes the reorganization into account
by reading section 302 and section 356(a)(2) in pari materia,
and thereby employing a hypothetical redemption test. But
Wright's hypothetical redemption test could be criticized on
technical grounds. In Shimberg, where the Fifth Circuit re-
fused to read section 302 and section 356(a)(2) in pari
120. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1973), affg 29 A.F.T.R.2d
72-1466 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959); Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct.
Cl. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958). But see Shimberg v. United States, 577
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the principles developed in § 302(b)(1) cases
are not always applicable to distributions under I.R.C. § 356(a)).
121. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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materia, the court emphasized the fact that the taxpayer had
never held any interest in the very corporation whose stock
the district court considered hypothetically redeemed. 2'
This criticism belies the purpose behind a post-reorgani-
zation, constructive redemption test. In the context of a single
corporation, a redemption analysis measures the changes in a
shareholder's corporate ownership and determines whether
there has been a substantial liquidation of his investment to
justify treating the exchange of his stock for a distribution of
property as a sale or exchange of an interest in property. If
the redemption is effected by a single corporation, the interest
in the corporation which is sold or exchanged is indirectly
transferred only to other veteran shareholders of that corpora-
tion. If the constructive redemption is effected in a reorgani-
zation, it indirectly transfers interests to the veteran share-
holders of the target and to the shareholders of the acquiring
corporation as well. But it is the extent of the reduction in the
redeeming shareholder's rights, as defined in Himmel v. Com-
missioner,'28 that is the crucial factor under section 302 in de-
termining the character of a redemption. This is true whether
section 302 is applied to a redemption made by a single corpo-
ration, or to a constructive redemption made in the course of
a reorganization.
The principles of section 302 should not be considered in-
applicable to the reorganized corporation's purchase of a
shareholder's stock merely because the shareholders of the ac-
quiring corporation are also recipients of the interests indi-
rectly transferred. The applicability of the redemption analy-
sis does not hinge on the shareholder's actual, pre-
hypothetical redemption ownership of stock or securities in
the acquired corporation. The purpose of the redemption
analysis is to measure the reduction in a shareholder's corpo-
rate ownership that is effected by the exchange of his stock
for boot. The constructive redemption format facilitates that
measurement.12'
122. See supra note 67.
123. 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964); see supra note 88.
124. The following is a proposed revision of § 356(a)(2) that would facilitate the
measurement of "dividend equivalency."
356(a)(2)(A)-If an exchange is described in paragraph (1) but has the
effect of the distribution of a dividend, then there shall be treated as a
dividend to each distributee such an amount of the gain recognized
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Honesty and consistency in the administration of the tax
laws would be served if the Service and the courts were to
adopt the Eighth Circuit's approach. The Service would no
longer feel constrained or authorized to abandon the hypo-
thetical redemption approach, and strike out for automatic
dividend treatment, whenever confronted by a reorganization
of commonly owned corporations. Armed with a hypothetical
redemption approach that would work well in all situations,
the Service could be consistent without leaving a loophole for
the reorganization of commonly owned corporations. 5
III. RATABLE SHARE OF THE UNDISTRIBUTED EARNINGS AND
PROFITS OF THE CORPORATION ACCUMULATED AFTER FEBRUARY
28, 1913
A. Earnings and Profits Accumulated After February 28,
1913
Commentators1' " seem to have generally agreed that the
shareholder's ratable share of the "undistributed earnings and
profits of the corporation accumulated after February 28,
under paragraph (1) as is not in excess of his ratable share of the cur-
rent and accumulated earnings and profits (other than earnings and
profits accumulated before February 28, 1913) of each party to the re-
organization in which he owned stock immediately prior to such reor-
ganization. The remainder, if any, of the gain recognized under para-
graph (1) shall be treated as gain from the exchange of property.
(B)-For the purpose of subparagraph (A), the determination of
whether the exchange has the effect of the distribution of a dividend
shall be made by applying § 302 to a constructive redemption of stock
that the distributee would have owned in the acquiring corporation im-
mediately after the reorganization if there had been no exchange of
stock for non-qualifying property. The non-qualifying property actu-
ally received by the distributee shall be deemed to have been received
in consideration of stock or securities in the acquiring corporation
equal in value to such non-qualifying property, according to the rela-
tive fair market values of the stock or securities that the distributee
actually owns immediately after the reorganization.
(C)-For the purposes of this section, "non-qualifying property"
means property not permitted by § 354 or § 355 to be received without
the recognition of gain.§ 318(b)(5) through (8) will be numbered (6) through (9), and the following provision
will be added: *
(5) section 356(a)(2) (relating to an exchange in a reorganization hav-
ing the effect of the distribution of a dividend).
125. See B. Brrriaa & J. EusTIcE, supra note 29, at § 14.34; 3 J. MERTENS,
LAwS oF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 20.148, 705 (1972); Samansky, supra note 20, at
13. But see Samansky, supra note 20, at 13 n.48.
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1913" does not include the current year's earnings and profits.
Section 316(a) supports this position. It uses the very same
words to state that the accumulated E&P have a different pri-
ority, in the case of a distribution under section 301, than the
priority assigned to the E&P of the current taxable year.
It is puzzling that Congress chose to exclude the current
year's E&P from the pool of earnings available for exchanges
that have the effect of a dividend under section 356(a)(2). The
possibilities for abuse or unduly lenient treatment, however,
are not so rife as to justify the conclusion that the legislators
redundantly used the term "accumulated" after "undistrib-
uted" for the sole purpose of emphasizing that Congress was
concerned only with post-February 28, 1913 earnings.1"6 The
more important problem, and one that requires greater con-
sideration, is determination of which corporation's E&P will
be used to determine the amount of taxable dividend under
section 356(a)(2).
B. Which Corporation is "The Corporation?"
If a shareholder's exchange of stock or securities for boot
has "the effect of a dividend" under section 356(a)(2), a por-
tion of his boot may be taxed at dividend rates. That portion
will be equal to the lesser of "his ratable share of the undis-
tributed earnings and profits of the corporation," or his recog-
nized gain. It is unclear which corporation is "the corpora-
tion" from which the shareholder is bailing out his share of
the retained earnings. Since the reorganizing corporations'
E&P accounts may differ, the proportion of the shareholder's
gain that is taxable as a dividend will vary depending upon
which corporation is identified as "the corporation."
126. The argument that the "redundancy" was intentionally drafted into §
356(a)(2) to emphasize that only post-February 28, 1913 earnings were within its pur-
view was made successfully for the first time in Vesper Co. Inc. v. Commissioner, 131
F.2d 200, 205 (8th Cir. 1942). The Tax Court subsequently followed this line of analy-
sis. W.H. Weaver v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1067, 1083-84 (1956). See also James Ar-
mour v. Commissioner, Inc., 43 T.C. 295, 310 (1964), where the Tax Court added the
corporation's current earnings and profits, without discussion, to the accumulated
earnings and profits in determining the amount of boot that should be taxed as
dividends.
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1. The "Transferor Analysis" and the "Total Corporate
Pool Approach"
Two interpretations of "the corporation" have been used
by the courts.127 The majority viewpoint adopted by the Ser-
vice, "the transferor analysis," is that the transferor or target
corporation is the source of the shareholder's ratable share of
E&P.12e One court has identified the combined corporate en-
terprise as "the corporation. '"I" Both approaches generate un-
desirable tax results.130
The bulk of the problems resulting from the viewpoint
that only the acquired corporation is "the corporation" arise
in cases of common ownership. The sale of stock in only one
corporation may be used to bail earnings out of another cor-
poration. Nevertheless, the proponents of the Service's posi-
tion generally feel that the 1924 Hypothetical leads to the
conclusion that Congress was concerned with a bailout of the
transferor's E&P only, and did not consider the possible
bailout of those of the transferee as well. 8 ' It is unclear why
the example in the Committee Reports requires the conclu-
sion that section 356(a)(2) applies only to a bailout from the
transferor. If nothing else, the 1924 Hypothetical evidenced a
Congressional understanding that a reorganization could be a
device for the distribution by one corporation of another's
earnings.
The fundamental flaw underlying the approach taken by
127. A third possible interpretation, i.e., viewing the acquiring corporation as
"the corporation," has never been approved by the courts. Such an interpretation
would inappropriately attribute to a shareholder, who had no interest in the acquir-
ing corporation before the reorganization, the earnings and profits that it had made
and accumulated before he acquired an interest in it.
128. See, e.g., American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970). Rev.
Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112; Ross, 173 F. Supp. at 798; Shimberg, 415 F. Supp. 832.
Support for this position has also been drawn from Tress. Reg. § 1.381(c)(2)-1(c)(1)
(1963). Samansky, supra note 20, at 35. The regulations state that the transferor's
earnings and profits are to be computed by taking into account the amount of earn-
ings properly allocable to the distribution. The regulation, however, could easily be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the "prior ownership approach" for the com-
putation of "ratable share." See infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text for an
explanation of the term "prior ownership approach." The portion of the distribution
properly allocable to the transferor's earnings and profits rather than the entire dis-
tribution, should be taken into account in computing the transferor's earnings and
profits.
129. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966).
130. See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
131. Ross, 173 F. Supp. 793; Idaho Power Co., 161 F. Supp. 807.
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the Service is that it attaches undue significance to the share-
holder's self-interested identification of the stock being ex-
changed for boot. For example, if both X, the separately in-
corporated vegetable purchasing division, and Y, the
supermarket chain of which B owned 8%, were acquired by
the Z Corporation conglomerate, B could allege that he was
exchanging only X stock for boot.1"2 Since X had very little
E&P, B could get a quantum of capital gain treatment that
otherwise would be denied him if Y's E&P were also included
in "his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits
of the corporation." In effect, he would get Y's accumulated
earnings at capital gain rates by simply claiming that he was
exchanging only X stock and no Y stock for the boot distribu-
tion he received from Z.1"'
This result is contrary to the general presumption that a
dividend distribution is presumed to be out of E&P to the full
extent of the E&P available for distribution to the share-
holder.1 34 When X and Y combined in the reorganization, B's
share of Y's E&P was just as available for distribution to him
as was his share of X's E&P. Interpreting "the corporation" as
referring only to the acquired or transferor corporation disre-
gards the full range of B's access to accumulated earnings.
The "transferor analysis" allows the shareholder to freely de-
termine the proportion of his boot that will be treated as a
dividend allowing him to designate which of his shares are be-
ing exchanged for boot.135
Equally erroneous results are obtained if "the corpora-
tion" is construed to mean the entire earnings and profits pool
of the reorganized corporate enterprise ("the total corporate
pool approach"). Anomalies arising from this construction
would be particularly likely to occur in the absence of com-
mon ownership.
132. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
133. B stands to benefit if X empties its tiny E&P account before the reorgani-
zation by distributing dividends. His X stock could thus serve as a means for bailing
out a large proportion of Y's E&P even if the exchange had the effect of a dividend.
134. See I.R.C. § 316 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See generally B. BITrKER & J.
EUSTICE, supra note 29, § 7.02, at 7-8.
135. A redemption of only X stock long before the reorganization would also
allow B to report the distribution at capital gain rates, but it might leave X without
enough operating capital. If X borrowed the funds distributed in anticipation of the
reorganization, the step transaction doctrine would bring the "redemption" within
the purview of § 356(a)(2).
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For example, assume that X Corporation has been doing
so badly that it has no retained earnings. Y Corporation, on
the other hand, has accumulated E&P when it acquires X. If
A were to exchange only ten of his shares in X for boot, the
exchange would "have the effect of a dividend" even under
the Wright test, limited to his ratable share of E&P. Under
the "total corporate pool" interpretation, his "ratable share"
would be computed by multiplying the combined enterprise's
E&P account by his percentage of ownership in the combined
enterprise. At least a nominal portion of his boot would be
treated as a dividend because some of Y's E&P would be
shifted to him.
This result is unfair because the one share that A ex-
changed for boot could have been redeemed at capital gain
rates before the reorganization, since X had no accumulated
E&P. A should not be charged with the earnings produced by
the veteran Y shareholders' investment. It would be unfair
and unreasonable to conclude that A had received a distribu-
tion of earnings, as a shareholder, from a corporation in which
he held no interest until the very moment of the
distribution. " 6
Earnings could also be unreasonably shifted away from A
if the combined enterprise's entire pool of E&P were the
"earnings and profits of the corporation." For example, X
might have $25 of accumulated earnings when acquired by Y
Corporation, which had no E&P. If A's "ratable share" of
E&P is computed in the same manner as in the preceding ex-
ample, the same E&P that X had before the reorganization
must be multiplied by his percentage of ownership in the
combined corporation. Because B's percentage of ownership in
the combined corporation would necessarily be less than his
percentage of ownership in X, his share of E&P would be di-
luted. His dividend exposure would therefore be reduced be-
low the $20 attributable to his 80% ownership of X, and he
would be able to bail some dividends out at capital gain rates.
The "total corporate pool" approach is unacceptable be-
cause of its potential for shifting E&P exposure to or away
from the shareholder. The "transferor analysis" must also be
136. By contrast, in the case of a "normal" dividend under § 301, the share-
holder almost invariably acquires his ownership interest in the corporation before the
distribution.
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rejected because of the loopholes it creates.13 7 Neither ap-
proach consistently reflects the amount of earnings which the
shareholder's pre-hypothetical redemption, stock investment
generated.
2. Judicial Advances in the Search for the Source of
E&P
Courts have generally adopted the "transferor analysis."
Only the earnings of the transferor corporation enter into the
computation of the shareholder's "ratable share of the undis-
tributed earnings and profits of the corporation. '"138 While
some courts have lamented the loophole that this approach
opens for shareholders owning stock in both the transferor
and transferee, 3 no court has devised a solution. Rather,
they have invariably left the matter to Congress.
14 0
The Fifth Circuit, in Davant v. Commissioner,"" at-
tempted to close the loophole. In that case, the same taxpay-
ers owned 100% of two corporations. They sold all their stock
in one corporation to a straw man for an amount that they
loaned to him. He subsequently caused his corporation to sell
all its assets to the other corporation for cash, liquidated his
corporation, and then used the proceeds to repay the loan
from the shareholders. The Fifth Circuit recharacterized the
transaction as a type D or F reorganization and found that the
shareholders' exchange of stock for cash had the effect of a
dividend.
The court refused, however, to limit the shareholders' di-
vided treatment to the E&P of the transferor corporation. In
one of its alternative holdings, the Fifth Circuit emphasized
the complete identity of shareholders and stated that it was
impossible to determine which corporation was "the corpora-
tion.11 2 Using both corporations' E&P accounts was therefore
137. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
138. American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. at 231; Ross, 173 F. Supp. at 796 n.3.
139. American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. at 231; Ross, 173 F. Supp. at 796 n.3.
140. See, e.g., American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. at 231; Estate of Bell, 30 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1221, 1225 (1975).
141. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966).
142. In its other alternative holding, the Fifth Circuit found that the distribu-
tion was out of the combined corporation's earnings and profits, was functionally un-
related to the reorganization, and was therefore governed by § 301 rather that §
356(a). Since there was a complete identity of shareholders, and the transferee corpo-
ration inherited the transferor's earnings and profits account, the result achieved by
[Vol. 23
DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCY
appropriate. In developing its opinion, the court noted:
Before the reorganization the petitioners had two pockets
with $900,000 in cash divided between them. After the re-
organization, the petitioners had removed all that cash
from both pockets, and it should, not matter that before
removing it completely they took it out of the right pock-
et and put it in the left. 4"
Further, even if the transferor corporation was "the corpora-
tion," section 482 was available to allocate the necessary tax
attributes to the transferor in order to prevent an evasion of
taxes.
144
The decision was commendable for its attempt to deal
with the common ownership loophole by finding that the "rat-
able share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the cor-
poration" somehow included the E&P of the transferor as
well. But the mechanisms employed were not suitable for gen-
eral application. 145 For example, section 482 could not apply
to a bailout by B because X and Y were not under common
control. Moreover, the notion that it is impossible to deter-
mine which corporation is "the corporation" can only be re-
lied upon if there is complete identity of shareholders. Any
disparity could make the combined E&P analysis
inapplicable.
In American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,' e the Tax Court
found itself confronted with common ownership and a boot
distribution in a non-divisive, type D reorganization. 4 7 In re-
sponse to the Service's suggestion that Davant should control,
the Tax Court detailed its reasons for rejecting the Fifth Cir-
cuit's analysis and for adhering to the generally accepted view
that only the transferor's E&P were available for boot divi-
dend treatment. ' However, the court erroneously relied on
the court's analysis accurately reflected economic reality. See infra note 148. See also
supra note 69.
143. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d at 889.
144. Id. at 890.
145. I.R.C. § 482 (1976) permits the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to re-
allocate income and deductions among commonly controlled businesses if such an
allocation is necessary to correctly reflect income.
146. 55 T.C. 204 (1970).
147. See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, chs. 13-14 (comprehensive
discussion of non-divisive type D reorganizations).
148. In rejecting the Fifth Circuit's alternative holding, which had found the
boot distribution "functionally unrelated" to the reorganization and thus within the
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the conclusion, drawn from the 1924 Hypothetical, that sec-
tion 356(a)(2) did not apply to bailouts from the transferee as
well. The Tax Court also stated that a singular interpretation
of "the corporation" was supported by reading section 354
and section 356(a)(2) together. While the court felt that this
singular interpretation followed from the fact that section 354
speaks of a singular "transferor," the court did not explain
why the "transferor" corporation in that non-recognition pro-
vision had to be "the corporation" from which section
356(a)(2) saw the shareholder bailing out dividends.
The Tax Court was not satisfied with the loophole that its
transferor analysis created and it attempted to minimize the
problem "which in reality exists only in certain limited situa-
tions. '"19 Having demonstrated the inadequacy of the Davant
court's attempt to provide a rational method to measure the
amount of dividend equivalency in cases of common owner-
ship, the Tax Court concluded that Congress must provide the
solution that the Tax Court's transferor analysis could not.
The Eighth Circuit's opinion, in Wright,'" hinted that it
might not be necessary to wait for Congressional action. In
determining whether the exchange of stock for boot had the
effect of a dividend, the court rejected the transferor analysis.
The Eighth Circuit went on to find instead that the distribu-
tion of boot should be viewed as having been made by the
combined corporation in exchange for its stock that the share-
holder would otherwise have received. Since the court held
that the distribution was based on the combined capital ac-
counts of both corporations, it seems logical to conclude that
purview of § 301, the Tax Court noted that the "functionally unrelated" approach
merely posed the question: "Could the property have been declared as a dividend
before [the reorganization]?" If the answer were "yes," then the distribution would be
characterized under § 301. Since this line of analysis renders § 356(a)( 2 ) superfluous,
the Tax Court declined to follow it. American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. at 228. See supra
note 142. In a recent article, however, the position is taken that pro rata distributions
arising from the combination of identically owned corporations should be taxed under
§ 301. See Samansky, supra note 20. This approach seems reasonable, but it should
be noted that it would require courts to ignore the example in the 1924 Committee
Reports. Since the example indicated that the dividend, within gain, limitation was
intended to apply to an abusive merger into a shell corporation, it would seem that
the dividend, within gain limitation, rather than § 301, must, a fortiori, apply to a
merger of two separate corporations, even if there is identical ownership and a pro
rata distribution. But see supra note 69; see also supra note 124.
149. American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. at 231.
150. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973), affg 29 A.F.T.R.2d 72-1466 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
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their combined earnings and profits account was the proper
one to be charged with the boot distribution.151 The dimen-
sions of the combined E&P account would therefore deter-
mine the amount of the shareholder's dividend treatment.
Having found that the exchange did not have the effect of a
dividend, the Eighth Circuit never reached the question of
how to properly compute the stockholder's "ratable share" of
the total combined E&P accounts of two reorganized corpora-
tions that were owned in different proportions before the
reorganization.
3. The "Prior Ownership Approach" as a Solution
Among the Wright court's contributions to the develop-
ment of dividend equivalency under section 356(a)(2) was its
holding that the stockholder's ownership in the transferee
must also be considered in determining whether an. exchange
had the effect of a dividend. The court recognized that a
transferor analysis would ignore a common ownership and
leave open a loophole for a bailout of E&P. The Fifth Cir-
cuit's earlier decision in Davant supplied the necessary step
towards a rational computation of the amount of dividends
distributed. The Fifth Circuit included the transferee corpora-
tion in the analysis which determines the amount of gain sub-
ject to dividend treatment. Neither Wright nor Davant, how-
ever, provided an adequate explanation of just how the E&P
of the combined corporation could be used without creating
anomalies. 152
These problems have a simple solution in the case of an
acquisitive reorganization. "The corporation" should be inter-
preted as referring to the reorganized corporation. The share-
holder's "ratable share" of the reorganized corporation's earn-
ings and profits should be determined by: (1) applying the
shareholder's percentage of ownership in each corporation, in
which he held stock before the reorganization, to the earnings
and profits account of that corporation, and (2) summing the
products of the (several) multiplication(s) mentioned in clause
(1).
This analysis, "the prior stock ownership approach," will
prevent both the loopholes and the punitive treatment that
151. But see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 138-51 and accompanying text.
1983]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
could be generated by using the "transferor analysis," or by
using the "total corporate pool" approach. The "prior stock
ownership" approach will consistently give an accurate mea-
surement of the accumulated earnings that the shareholder is
bailing out. In cases of common ownership, where the trans-
feror analysis could shift E&P away from the shareholder, the
prior ownership approach would instead charge him with
earnings properly attributable to the stock he owned. For ex-
ample, A's separately incorporated vegetable wholesaling divi-
sion could no longer serve as a bailout device. 153 Whether X
merged into Y or vice versa, or both merged into Z, the
amount of E&P available for A's dividend treatment would be
the same.
In cases where the shareholder held stock only in the
transferor, he would neither find himself charged with earn-
ings made by another corporation, nor be able to shift away
and dilute his dividend exposure through the reorganiza-
tion.' For example, if X had no E&P when it merged into a
Y Corporation in which A held no stock before the reorganiza-
tion, A would not be charged with dividend treatment on his
boot merely because Y had E&P. Nor would the E&P availa-
ble for his dividend exposure be reduced if Y had no E&P
while X had a substantial amount.
From a purely linguistic standpoint, the "prior stock own-
ership approach" has both strengths and weaknesses. On the
one hand, it assigns a literal and natural meaning to the words
"ratable share." This construction reasonably treats the
shareholder as though he draws his dividend from the E&P or
reorganizing corporations to the extent of his ratable or pro-
portionate interest in each of them. But the "prior stock own-
ership approach" may underemphasize Congress' use of "the
corporation." Congress could simply have added to section
203(d)(2) the words: "ratable shares of the undistributed
earnings and profits of the reorganizing corporation in which
he held stock before the reorganization" if it intended to
adopt this approach. The legislators' failure to include those
words could be regarded as evidence that they did not view
the claimed exchange of only X stock as a potential subter-
fuge that might be used to hide the removal of earnings from
153. See supra text accompanying note 148.
154. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
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Y as well.
There are two possible responses to these objections.
First, the transferor analysis could be regarded as the only
correct one. But, this would require the conclusion that the
results discussed above were either intended by Congress, or
simply escaped Congress' attention. Such conclusions would
also ignore the fact that section 356(a)(2) was enacted for the
specific purpose of preventing the use of the reorganization
format as a device for the bailout of earnings at capital gain
rates.
Alternatively, the prior stock ownership approach could
be regarded as the better form of analysis. Even assuming ar-
guendo that it is a more liberal reading of the statute, it could
be adopted for the simple reason that it generates a consist-
ently just interpretation of the Code. The policy of assigning
words their commonplace meaning " should give way to the
countervailing need for consistency, particularly when a stat-
ute is of uncertain meaning, as is the case here, and erroneous
results would otherwise obtain.5'5
Even if Congress was unaware that there could be a
bailout of the transferee's E&P, as the Tax Court has
claimed, 157 and even if Congress simply did not know what it
was doing when it enacted section 203(d)(2), as some com-
mentators have suggested, 158 Congress at least was vague
enough to give the courts the freedom to interpret section
356(a)(2) without creating outrageous results. Courts should
use that freedom even if they find the linguistic format of sec-
tion 356(a)(2) somewhat disturbing. Mertens points out, "[ifn
recent years, the courts have not felt bound to apply slavishly
the literal phrasing of statutes when the clearly indicated pur-
pose of the Congress seems to require a broader or narrower
interpretation.' ' Section 316 clearly expressed the broad
Congressional intent that dividends should be taxed as such
155. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 310 U.S. 534
(1940); A. L. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); DeSoto
Sec. Co. v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1956); ABC Brewing Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 224 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1955).
156. See, e.g., Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389 (1940); Zellerbach Paper
Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172 (1934); Burnett v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933);
Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327 (1930).
157. American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. at 230.
158. Samansky, supra note 20, at 46; Shoulson, supra note 20, at 578-79.
159. 1 J. MERTENS, supra note 125, at § 3.04, 9.
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to the full extent of the earnings and profits available for the
shareholder's distribution. Courts should not frustrate that
clearly stated intent without a good reason.
Thus, even if it is within the letter of section 356(a)(2) to
bail earnings out of the transferee through an exchange of the
transferor's stock, it is not within the spirit of section
356(a)(2). This triumph of form over substance was not within
the intention of its makers and should not be allowed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Various tests have been set out by the courts and com-
mentators for determining whether gain recognized as a con-
sequence of a reorganization will be taxed at capital gain rates
or be given dividend treatment. The automatic dividend rule
ignores the sale approach while the test employed by the dis-
trict court in Shimberg overemphasizes it. The former leads to
harsh results, while the latter invariably results in dividend
treatment. Applicability of a partial liquidation analysis will
always be uncertain. Therefore, it is advisable to effect such a
liquidation prior to the reorganization to avoid possible divi-
dend treatment.
Revenue Ruling 75-83 recognizes that an exchange of
stock in a reorganization can be either purely capital in nature
or equivalent to a dividend. Its focus only on the redemption
of the target corporation stock, however, leads to discrimina-
tory treatment of the target corporation shareholders while it
leaves a loophole for "bailing out" E&P to shareholders of
both the target and acquiring corporations.
Wright, by contrast, treats redemptions in a manner
which is logically consistent with section 302. The Wright
court properly held that dividend equivalency should be de-
termined by a post-reorganization, constructive redemption
analysis under the principles of section 302. This approach
was justified because the shareholders holding stock in similar
or related corporations might find a loophole for the bailout of
E&P if the separate-corporation transferor analysis were em-
ployed. Only the use of a multi-corporate framework enables a
court to inquire whether the shareholder was bailing out E&P
from the corporate enterprise, under the guise of a sale of part
or all of his interest in one of its corporate facets. The Wright
court's multi-corporate framework also avoids the anoma-
lously harsh treatment that Revenue Ruling 75-83, based on a
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transferor analysis, imposed on larger shareholders in the tar-
get corporation.
If a distribution to a shareholder who had an interest in
more than one corporation has the effect of a dividend, the
logic of the Wright decision requires that the amount of his
dividend should be computed by reference to the E&P of all
of the reorganizing corporations in which he held stock before
the reorganization. This inference follows since the Wright
test referred to the shareholder's original, total combined
stock ownership in determining whether he had received a
dividend. It would therefore be unreasonable to limit the
amount of his dividend, his "ratable share" of the undistrib-
uted earnings of "the corporation," to the E&P of the desig-
nated 60 transferor corporation.
Two tests are currently used for determining which cor-
porate E&P's will be used for dividend treatment. The trans-
feror analysis ignores common ownership leaving a loophole
for a bailout of E&P. The "total corporate pool" approach is
unacceptable because of its potential for shifting E&P expo-
sure to or away from the shareholder. The "prior stock owner-
ship approach" to the determination of the shareholder's "rat-
able share" of E&P, involves a reading of section 356(a)(2)
that is no less literal than the transferor analysis approved by
the Tax Court and the Service. On the other hand, even if the
prior stock ownership approach is regarded as a more liberal
reading of the Code, it is a necessary one which most accu-
rately reflects the legislators' intent.
Because the Wright test treats redemptions in a manner
which is logically consistent with section 302, and the "prior
stock ownership approach" most consistently reflects the
amount of E&P which the shareholder's stock investment
generated prior to the hypothetical redemption, adherence to
these rules will provide the most accurate measurement of
"dividend equivalency."
160. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33 (example of a shareholder
designating only one corporation as the transferor. This misleading designation ena-
bled him to bail earnings out of that corporation and another corporation he con-
trolled by merging both corporations into an unrelated third corporation).
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